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ARTICLES
FAITH AND FAITHFULNESS IN CORPORATE
THEORY
Lyman P. Q. Johnson'
"[Tihe duties traditionally analyzed as belonging to corporate fi-
duciaries, loyalty and care, are but constituent elements of the
overarching concepts of allegiance, devotion and
faithfulness .... 1
"Who then is the faithful and wise manager, whom the master
puts in charge... ?"'
I. INTRODUCTION
Discourse in corporate law theory is highly secular. This quality both
reflects, and shapes, the nature of discourse within corporations them-
selves.3  Virtually nontheoretical until the mid-1970s, corporate law
scholarship has been deeply influenced in the last thirty years by neoclas-
sical economic analysis,4 and, more recently, it has been enriched by a
+ Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University Law School.
The Frances Lewis Law Center provided financial support for this project. I am grateful
for comments from Sam Calhoun, Faith Kahn, and David Millon, and from participants in
the Georgetown conference on Socio-Economics and in the 2006 AALS annual meeting of
the section on Socio-Economics and from a faculty workshop at the University of St. Tho-
mas Law School. Matthew Trinidad and Aaron Wilson contributed excellent research
assistance. Luanita embodies the quality of faithfulness, for which I am especially grateful.
1. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney), No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651,
at *36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), afftd, No. 411,2005,2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8,2006).
2. Luke 12:42 (New International).
3. Sociologist Alan Wolfe has described how the language of economics in the cor-
poration attributes "to the impersonal logic of the market" conduct that many employees
find disloyal. ALAN WOLFE, MORAL FREEDOM 30 (2001). Framing workplace relations
purely in financial terms may mean "the emphasis on putting one's own interest first ... in
the economy" carries over into the realm of family and other social relations. Id. at 48.
The nature of discourse in theory, therefore, can shape corporate practice, which, in turn,
can alter our larger social reality, which scholars may then believe corresponds to theory.
4. The seminal work is by Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel.
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUcTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991).
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host of other perspectives. These contributions draw broadly on
behavioral economics,' socioeconomics,6 psychology,' sociology,8 femi-
nism,9 critical race theory,'0 history," and various "progressive" vantage
points.12 Although vast differences in theoretical outlook and prescrip-
tive thrust characterize modern corporate scholarship, virtually all such
scholarship shares a common feature: it is a secular discourse, both in
grammar and focus, notwithstanding that the larger society in which the
corporate institution is situated continues to be a very religious society. 3
The vocabulary of corporate law theory may be secular because that
which is observed-the corporation-is thought to be a wholly secular
institution best understood solely in secular terms,' or because the over-
5. E.g., Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and Effi-
ciency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2002); Sympo-
sium, Behavioral Analysis of Corporate Law: Instruction or Distraction?, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1 (2006).
6. E.g., LYNN L. DALLAS, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY: A SOCIOECONOMIC
APPROACH (2005).
7. E.g., James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
83 (1985); Daniel J. H. Greenwood, Discussing Corporate Misbehavior: The Conflicting
Norms of Market, Agency, Profit and Loyalty, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (2005).
8. E.g., Gerald F. Davis, New Directions in Corporate Governance, 31 ANN. REV.
Soc. 143 (2005); Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992) (reviewing ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE
GOOD SOCIETY (1991); EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 4).
9. E.g., Kellye Y. Testy, Capitalism and Freedom-For Whom?: Feminist Legal The-
ory and Progressive Corporate Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (2004); Andrew C.
Wicks et al., A Feminist Reinterpretation of the Stakeholder Concept, 4 Bus. ETHICS Q. 475
(1994).
10. E.g., Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility:
Empathy and Race Discrimination, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1461 (2002).
11. E.g., Reiner Kraakman, Henry Hansmann & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335 (2006); Symposium, Understanding Corporate Law
Through History, 63 WASH & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
12. E.g., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Sympo-
sium, New Directions in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1993).
13. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE 21 (2d ed. 1986)
("[I]n sociological fact, the values of the American people are deeply rooted in religion.").
A recent poll of 1004 Americans reveals that 64% describe themselves as religious, 64%
pray every day, 57% describe spirituality as very important in their daily life, and 45% say
they attend worship services at least weekly. Where We Stand on Faith, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
29/Sept. 5, 2005, at 48, 48-49; see also George H. Gallup, Jr. & Byron R. Johnson, New
Index Tracks "Spiritual State of the Union," GALLUP POLL, Jan. 28, 2003,
http://poll.gallup.com/content/default.aspx?ci=7657 (noting that 69% of Americans "feel
the need to experience spiritual growth in their daily lives"). A recent study confirms that
entering college students, with some variance along gender and ethnic lines, remain highly
religious. Stacy A. Teicher, Of Gender, Race and Spirituality, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 13, 2005, at 13, 13-14.
14. A recent piece on accommodating religious beliefs in law school class discussions
probably captures accurately what many legal scholars think about the irrelevance of relig-
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arching conceptual framework of most scholars is itself exclusively secu-
lar, thereby overlooking the corporation's religious dimension. A busi-
ness corporation, however, is not, and need not be, inherently secular in
nature. Rather, in various ways, its affairs can reflect religious views of
both the larger society in which it functions and the senior decision-
makers who direct its activities. Before elaborating, it should be noted at
the outset that there is no constitutional impediment to this view of the
corporation. Although the corporation is an important social institu-
tion-as are the family, private schools, clubs, and a boundless array of
other voluntary groupings-it is not an arm of the state. Consequently,
First Amendment concerns about the "separation of church and state" do
not mandate a "separation of faith and corporation." The absence of
religious language in scholarly and business discourse, therefore, reflects
a social practice, not a legal requirement.
Modem corporate theory, although secular in voice, conceives corpo-
rate relations in such a way as to be open to the potential influence of
religious faith on corporate conduct. This is true whether one adheres,
descriptively, to the highly individualistic, contractarian conception of the
corporation, or to a more organic, communitarian view. It holds true as
well whether one believes, prescriptively, that decision-makers should
exclusively pursue, on the one hand, shareholder welfare or, on the other
hand, the well-being of the corporate enterprise itself, the interests of
various stakeholders, or both. This is so because, whatever their different
theoretical approaches or normative commitments might be, corporate
scholars uniformly acknowledge that a central feature of corporate life is
broad managerial discretion. 5 Discretion exists, within limits, both as to
what goals the corporation should pursue and how it does so. The exer-
cise of that discretion will be influenced by the actor's understanding of
which social norms and moral convictions are relevant to business deci-
sions. The question of which norms and convictions should play a role in
the business setting is one that, in turn, may reflect core religious beliefs.
A corporate actor without religious beliefs will, of course, formulate his
or her actions without looking to faith for guidance. A corporate actor
with religious beliefs, however, may not look to them for guidance-or
may not readily state that they are being looked to-for a variety of rea-
sons. The actor may consider the beliefs to be a permitted but unhelpful
source of guidance. Or, an actor may find religious beliefs helpful but
ion to corporations. Robert L. Palmer, Is God on Your Seating Chart?: Discussing Reli-
gious Beliefs in Class, LAW TCHR., Fall 2005, at 1. Professor Palmer states that "[students'
religious] beliefs often stay far below the surface, in part because religious concepts are not
readily applicable to much of the law school curriculum. Contracts, property, tax courses,
business organizations, and civil procedure fall into this category." Id. (emphasis added);
see also infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 25, 47-48 and accompanying text.
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believe that drawing on them is forbidden, due to a misunderstanding of
law or by interpreting social norms as frowning on such guidance. Fi-
nally, an actor may actively draw on religious beliefs but not use religious
language to express that influence, choosing instead to "translate" the
rationales for the decision into secular language. As an empirical matter,
we know relatively little about how corporate officers and directors actu-
ally draw on religious faith in forming decisions,16 or whether they believe
it inappropriate to do so, and, if so, why. Religious faith and religious
discourse may or may not be playing a significant role in corporate deci-
sion-making.
This Article addresses the nature of corporate discourse. It argues that
neither discourse within the corporate institution itself nor within corpo-
rate law theory must be wholly secular. Current conceptions of corpo-
rateness do not exclude-indeed, they invite -introduction of religious
faith into corporate decision-making. At the same time, existing theories
of corporateness cannot and do not mandate the use of religious faith by
decision-makers, and this Article does not so advocate. Such use, how-
ever, is permitted where it does not conflict with antidiscrimination laws.
As to whether religious faith will more significantly inform corporate
decision-making in the years ahead, the answer will depend on senior
decision-makers themselves. They can, but need not, draw on and ex-
press themselves in ways influenced by faith. That is precisely the upshot
of discretion. Discourse within the corporation may continue to be secu-
lar in nature because senior decision-makers may choose, for the most
part, to think and speak in secular terms. It may, on the other hand, un-
der the prodding of those who appreciate the breadth of managerial dis-
cretion and urge the value of faith in guiding its exercise, become a more
mixed and bi-vocal discourse, part secular and part religious in nature.
The subject of religious talk in American society remains controversial.
By arguing for a more prominent religious voice within corporate dis-
course, this Article seeks to alleviate this larger controversy, not com-
pound it. The argument proceeds in several steps. Part II summarizes
one key issue where corporate law scholars fundamentally disagree and
another key issue where there appears to be broad consensus. Scholars
continue to differ, as do many in society at large, as to the basic question
of corporate purpose-many argue for unbridled shareholder primacy,
while others seek to include the welfare of the enterprise itself and vari-
ous stakeholders within the corporate scope. By contrast, scholars agree,
and corporate law confirms, that directors and officers possess very broad
16. We do have some important empirical work on how faith influences managers.
E.g., MARC GUNTHER, FAITH AND FORTUNE (2004); LAURA L. NASH, BELIEVERS IN
BUSINESS (1994). These studies and other, non-legal scholarship will be treated in Part
III.A.
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decision-making latitude, a latitude only imperfectly constrained by mar-
kets, norms, and law. The upshot is that senior decision-makers have
significant freedom in charting how modem corporations behave and
whose interests they advance.
Part III considers scholarly treatments of the role religious faith might
play in guiding and constraining corporate managers. Scholarship out-
side the legal academy is far more plentiful on this subject. Recently,
within corporate law, a few pioneering scholars have begun asking how
Catholic social thought might usefully contribute to an understanding
(and reform) of corporate conduct.17 Professor Susan Stabile has gone
further and advocates external legal change , a direction this author re-
jects in favor of a voluntary approach aimed at altering the nature of dis-
course within the corporation.
Part IV shows how, without any further legal reform, religious faith can
constructively influence corporate law and discourse by shedding light on
a concept recently invoked by Chancellor William Chandler in the high-
profile Disney litigation.'9 That concept is the obligation of faithfulness,
which Chancellor Chandler, in his treatment of good faith, characterized
as "overarching" the traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. 20
Faithfulness is a term decidedly absent from the financial/economic vo-
cabulary that has so powerfully shaped corporate theory since the 1970s.2
As directors and officers-and their legal counsel-struggle to under-
stand and implement the mandate of faithfulness, they can usefully turn
to religious faith, where the notion of faithfulness has rich meaning, as
shown in Part V. This is especially important now as the Delaware Su-
17. These scholars are Dean Mark Sargent and Professors Susan Stabile and Stephen
Bainbridge. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation, 1 J.
CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 595 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Catholic Social Thought];
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Law and Economics: An Apologia, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES
ON LEGAL THOUGHT 209 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Bain-
bridge, Apologia]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder
Debate, 4 VILL. J.L. & INV. MGMT. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Bishops]; Mark A.
Sargent, Competing Visions of the Corporation in Catholic Social Thought, 1 J. CATH. SOC.
THOUGHT 561 (2004) [hereinafter Sargent, Competing Visions]; Mark A. Sargent, Utility,
the Good and Civic Happiness: A Catholic Critique of Law and Economics, 1 J. CATH.
LEGAL STUD. 35 (2005) [hereinafter Sargent, Utility]; Susan J. Stabile, A Catholic Vision of
the Corporation, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 181 (2005) [hereinafter Stabile, Catholic
Vision]; Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to Promote Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 839 (2004) [hereinafter Stabile, Using Religion]; see also Robert Ashford,
Using Christian Principles to Enhance Economic Theory and Practice: Louis Kelso's Bi-
nary Economics as the More Christian and Scientific Way (Nov. 9, 2002) (on file with
Catholic University Law Review), available at http://cog.kent.edu/lib/Ashford.pdf.
18. Stabile, Using Religion, supra note 17.
19. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36
(Del. Ch. Aug. 9,2005), affd, No. 411,2005,2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8,2006).
20. Id.
21. See infra Part IL.
2006]
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preme Court, in affirming the trial court decision in Disney, noted that
the concept of good faith is "not a well-developed area... [and] is, up to
this point relatively uncharted." The concept of faithfulness thus pre-
sents a rare opportunity to explore the overlap of corporate and religious
discourses. Part V uses, as an example, biblical treatments of faithful-
ness. These instances are, it bears emphasizing, illustrative, as each faith
tradition may have its own teaching on faithful managerial conduct.
The larger point assuredly is not that fiduciary duty law-or any other
dimension of corporate law-is or must be grounded in religious faith.
The point, rather, is that senior business leaders can (but are not required
to) draw on their faith tradition's rendering of faithfulness to augment
their understanding of how to be legally faithful. Moreover, they not
only can do so, they are free to (and should) say they are doing so and
explain its relevance and helpfulness. This voluntary, non-legislative ap-
proach leaves to the individual, exercising his or her discretion, whether
to seek guidance on the meaning of faithfulness in his or her faith.
Part VI elaborates the several benefits to be gained from enriching
corporate theory and corporate practice with religious discourse. These
benefits include, at a minimum, providing a persuasive ground for reli-
gious business elites to avoid using corporate positions primarily to pro-
mote self-interest, and, more affirmatively, may provide some leaders
with a more secure foundation for pursuing socially responsible corporate
conduct. Others, to be sure, may conclude that greater faithfulness
means that stricter allegiance to investor interests is called for. How un-
derstandings of faith will influence corporate conduct has no predeter-
mined normative endpoint. Its outcome, rather, will depend on how
leaders themselves-who should be representative of the larger society-
interpret the teachings of their faiths. In a pluralist society, the view-
points of directors and officers drawn from a cross-section of society will
likely mirror the range of views on the larger question of the role of relig-
ion in a liberal democracy.
Other benefits of de-secularizing corporate discourse include the likeli-
hood of overcoming a manager's unhealthy sense of dividedness between
work and faith, introducing viewpoint diversity into the upper reaches of
corporations, and serving as a "safe place" to experiment-free of consti-
tutional concerns-with an approach that encourages, rather than frowns
on, the invocation of religion in debates over matters of social and public
significance.2 Lessons learned from permitting and encouraging religious
discourse in the corporate venue, an important institution standing be-
22. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 2006 WL 1562466, at *24.
23. Professor Noah Feldman proposes a relaxing of concern over the use of religious
speech on matters of public policy. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S
CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM -AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 236-39 (2005).
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tween the individual and the state, not only will change the ethos of cor-
porate culture, they may reduce anxiety concerning the use of such dis-
course in larger public debates.
II. DISCORD AND AGREEMENT IN CORPORATE THEORY
Corporate law scholars continue to vehemently disagree on a basic pre-
scriptive subject-the purpose of corporate endeavor24-while widely
agreeing (more or less) on a key descriptive feature of corporate life: the
existence of broad managerial discretion.2' The descriptive reality of
managerial discretion is, in fact, what makes possible the normative dis-
agreement on corporate purpose. Unless business leaders possess at least
some freedom to choose one course of action over another, any moral or
policy debate about corporate purpose lacks practical significance. This
Part first briefly sketches the unresolved controversy over corporate pur-
pose, and then develops at somewhat greater length the claim that mana-
gerial discretion remains a central, and seemingly inescapable, feature in
corporate law. Both points are critical components of the argument-
developed in Parts III through VI-that religious faith can usefully guide
the exercise of discretion as managers make decisions about proper cor-
porate conduct and purpose.
A. Competing Conceptions of Corporate Purpose
To the consternation of many corporate law scholars, 26 the near cen-
tury-long debate about the purpose(s) of corporate endeavor shows no
sign of abating. 7 Many corporate scholars, perhaps most, believe it is
socially desirable for directors and officers to attend first and foremost to
24. For a collection of legal scholarship favoring shareholder wealth maximization as
the exclusive corporate purpose, see Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 736 n.1, 745 n.12 (2005) (collecting scholarship).
Elhauge challenges this view at length, developing several arguments in favor of permitting
managers to consider the public interest at the expense of profits in making decisions. Id.
at 783-814. For the views of scholars opposing an exclusive focus on shareholder wealth,
see supra note 12 (collecting scholarship).
25. See Elhauge, supra note 24, at 763-77 (describing reasons for managerial discre-
tion to sacrifice profits). For one of many scholarly treatments of managerial authority
and discretion, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2002).
26. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Con-
tractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856,
859-60 (1997) (book review); Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?:
Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 109 (2004) (describing the debate over corporate purpose).
27. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's
Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 754-57 (2001); Kent Greenfield, New Principles for Corporate
Law, 1 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 87, 87-89 (2005). See generally supra notes 5-12 (collecting
views of various scholars).
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the interests of shareholders.8 Under this "shareholder primacy" con-
ception of corporate purpose, rooted in the contractarian theory of cor-
porate relations, 9 directors and officers owe fiduciary duties primarily,
perhaps exclusively, to shareholders. The interests of other non-
shareholder constituent groups, such as employees, creditors, suppliers,
or local communities in which the corporation operates, are not thought
by these scholars to be the proper focus of fiduciary duties.30 Rather,
these "stakeholders" are best protected, under this view, by private con-
tract or special purpose legislation.3
A significant number of corporate scholars, probably still a minority,
believe directors and officers should take a more expansive view of their
fiduciary duties, and appropriately consider the interests of the company
itself and all its constituents, both shareholders and non-shareholders.32
This conception-often dubbed a "communitarian" or "progressive" out-
look3 -is longstanding in corporate law 4 and business ethics literature, 35
and it is informed by an interest in encouraging socially responsible cor-
porate conduct.36 It gained new life in the 1980s when many scholars
grew alarmed over the perceived damage caused to non-shareholders by
an unfettered, shareholder-enriching takeover market fueled by slavish
adherence to a pro-investor normative model.37 This "contrarian" school
28. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Prelimi-
nary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 798 & n.35 (2002) ("Today, most corporate law
scholars embrace some variant of shareholder primacy."); Elhauge, supra note 24, at 736
n.1 (collecting scholarship).
29. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 1-39. Mark Roe has
described this contractarian model, which "focuses on the three-player game of allocating
decisionmaking authority among managers, the board, and shareholders[,] ... [and which]
is the model that has dominated corporate law scholarship and that continues to dominate
it." Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of Corporate Law?, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2002).
30. See Elhauge, supra note 24, at 736 n.1; Winkler, supra note 26, at 110.
31. Winkler, supra note 26, at 119-23.
32. See supra note 12. For an extensive comparison of this school of thought and the
contractarian model, see David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201,
220-31 (1990); see also Greenfield, supra note 27.
33. See supra note 12.
34. See Bratton, supra note 27, at 760-62; Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and
Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781,789-93 (1986).
35. E.g., Christine A. Hemingway & Patrick W. Maclagan, Managers' Personal Values
as Drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility, 50 J. Bus. ETHICS 33 (2004) (describing
literature). For a business ethicist's assessment of stakeholder interests in the business
corporation, see Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 53 (1991) (arguing for moral but non-fiduciary obligations to stakeholders).
36. Hemingway & Maclagan, supra note 35, at 36-41 (noting importance of manage-
rial discretion for socially responsible conduct).
37. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 2245-48; Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Cor-
porate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1715-17 (1993).
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of thought was long hampered by the lack of affirmative models of corpo-
rate relationships, with much of the scholarly work largely arguing
against a full-fledged shareholder primacy model. The "team produc-
tion" theory advanced by Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout,
38
and other recent efforts,39 represent efforts to develop more robust mod-
els of corporate interaction.
At the doctrinal level, developments since the late 1980s suggest sup-
port for a conception of fiduciary duties that permits consideration of
both non-shareholder and shareholder interests. This is seen in statutory
law, where all corporate statutes permit charitable donations,40 and ap-
proximately thirty states in the 1980s enacted statutes expressly empow-
ering boards of directors to consider an array of interests other than
shareholders.4' No statute, by way of contrast, mandates that only share-
holder interests are to be advanced.42 In case law, Delaware requires an
exclusive focus on shareholder welfare only in the important, but never-
theless limited, change of control (Revlon) setting.43 In other contexts,
directors are free to consider non-shareholder interests.' Many states,
moreover, have rejected the Revlon approach, either by statute45 or caselaw.46
38. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 320-28 (1999).
39. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 27 (articulating new principles for corporate law).
40. JESSE H. CHOPER ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 39 (6th
ed. 2004).
41. See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 2.01 reporter's note 8, 6.02 cmt. a (1994) (collecting stat-
utes). For an analysis of these statutes, see, for example, Lyman Johnson & David Millon,
Missing the Point about State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 847-56 (1989), and
David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223,240-48 (1991).
42. Elhauge, supra note 24, at 763.
43. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (noting that the board is obligated to obtain highest share price in corporate break-
up); Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. (In re Paramount Commc'ns, Inc.
S'holders Litig.), 637 A.2d 34, 43-45 (Del. 1994) (clarifying duty to maximize share price in
sale). But see Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1203-04 (2002) (noting the limited reach of Revlon).
44. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. (In re Time Inc. S'holder Litig.), 571 A.2d
1140, 1143 (Del. 1990); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del.
1985); see also Roe, supra note 29, at 1267 (describing how non-shareholder interests might
influence judges).
45. Statutes permitting consideration of non-shareholder interests necessarily reject
Revlon. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. In a recent Conference Board poll of
25,000 people in twenty-three countries, "two-thirds said they want business to 'expand
beyond the traditional emphasis on profits and contribute to broader social objectives.'"
Jane Lampman, Trend-watcher Sees Moral Transformation of Capitalism, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Oct. 3, 2005, at 13.
46. See, e.g., Willard ex rel. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Moneta Bldg. Supply, Inc.,
515 S.E.2d 277, 284 (Va. 1999) (rejecting Revlon duty in sale of corporation's control).
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At the moment, the enduring question of corporate purpose has not
been definitively resolved either in corporate theory or corporate doc-
trine. If anything, corporate doctrine at present is far more receptive to a
broad conception of fiduciary duties than orthodox corporate theory ac-
knowledges. This is due, in large measure, to the vast discretion pos-
sessed by corporate decision-makers.
B. Managerial Discretion
Unlike the normative question of corporate purpose, there is broad
consensus that, as a descriptive matter, corporate law accords directors
and officers wide latitude to act.47 Even theorists believing that various
markets more or less effectively constrain corporate conduct acknowl-
edge a significant amount of managerial discretion.48 Where scholars
disagree is over the degree of discretion,49 and over what, if anything,
should be done to encourage or mandate better use of discretion and
more effectively constrain its misuse.5°
Professor Einer Elhauge recently developed at length both the descrip-
tive and prescriptive case for "bounded" managerial discretion to sacri-
fice corporate profits in the public interest." Professor Elhauge offers a
number of theoretical reasons as to why profit-sacrificing behavior is de-
sirable. These include the argument that shareholder welfare is actually
increased when managers are free to sacrifice profits because a legally
enforceable duty to maximize profits would mean substantial litigation
over operational decisions.53 Courts are unable to accurately ascertain
either whether specific decisions did or did not maximize profits in the
short run, or whether any sacrifice of profits would yield larger long-run
profits due to increased corporate goodwill m Furthermore, litigation ex
post over the substantive wisdom of corporate decisions may carry its
own significant error rate and is likely to be quite costly. 5 Moreover,
Elhauge argues, discretion that sacrifices profits ex post may enhance
profits ex ante by inducing various non-shareholder constituents to invest
in a company while expecting managers to reciprocate later by sacrificing
47. For a good overview, see STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND
ECONOMIcs 35-38, 192-208 (2002).
48. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L.
REv. 1259, 1263-64 (1982).
49. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 29, at 1256-60 (exploring how discretion might be con-
strained by culture).
50. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 47, at 37-38 (noting tradeoff between increased
discretion and reduced accountability, and vice versa).
51. Elhauge, supra note 24, at 745,776-818.
52. Id. at 776-818.
53. Id. at 777.
54. Id. at 777-79.
55. Id. at 778.
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profits ex post.6 In addition, such profit-sacrificing behavior may reflect
the public interest views of most shareholders, though shareholders
themselves, often caricatured as wealth-obsessed, cannot directly express
those social views due to collective action problems. 7 Even where man-
agers do deviate from shareholder views about corporate purpose, rely-
ing on social sanctions and internalized moral norms to guide the exercise
of management discretion-rather than an enforceable legal duty-may
lead to corporate conduct more congruent with widespread social and
moral norms. 8
Whatever theoretical justifications for managerial discretion might be
offered, and whether or not such discretion is thought to be socially de-
sirable, it clearly exists as a matter of positive law. One important reason
it exists is that, under corporate statutes, shareholders elect directors,5 9
but do not elect officers,6 and neither directors nor officers are obligated
to do what shareholders want. Another reason directors and officers
have discretion is that, as fiduciaries, they are not obligated to act only in
the best interests of shareholders, 61 but rather, are to act "in the best in-
terests of the corporation, 62 or, in Delaware, in the best interests of "the
corporation and its shareholders., 63 What is in the interests of the "cor-
poration" on any particular matter depends almost entirely on the judg-
ment of directors and officers. Finally, courts pay homage to this alloca-
tion of decision-making power through the business judgment rule,64 the
56. Id. at 779-81.
57. Id. at 783, 793-96. Fifteen years ago, Professor Goodpaster similarly argued that
"[w]hat we must understand is that the responsibilities of management toward stockhold-
ers are of a piece with the obligations that stockholders themselves would be expected to
honor in their own right." Goodpaster, supra note 35, at 68. He called this the "Nemo Dat
Principle" from the Latin proverb nemo dat quod non habet-"nobody gives what he
doesn't have." Id. Goodpaster considers this "a formal requirement of consistency in
business ethics" and summarizes it as follows: "Investors cannot expect of managers (more
generally, principals cannot expect of their agents) behavior that would be inconsistent
with the reasonable ethical expectations of the community." Id.; see supra note 45, for
evidence of social support for a broader conception of corporate purpose.
58. Elhauge, supra note 24, at 796-805.
59. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.28
(2005).
60. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b) (2001); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.40.
61. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
62. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30(a).
63. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). Delaware's formulation of the
business judgment rule is expressed as a presumption that directors acted in the best inter-
ests of the corporation. Id. at 812. Decisions long have made clear, however, that the
intended beneficiaries of director fiduciary duties are the corporation and its stockholders.
See, e.g., id. at 811; Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225, 238 (Del. Ch. 1938), affd, 5 A.2d 503
(Del. 1939).
64. For a description of the Delaware business judgment rule, see Lyman P.Q. John-
son, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 454-55 (2005).
20061
Catholic University Law Review
cornerstone doctrine in corporate law.6' Although variously formulated,
the central tenet of the business judgment rule is that, absent a loyalty or
good faith concern, courts review only the decision-making process, not
the substantive merits of business decisions. 66 Relatedly, the fiduciary
duty of care has no substantive thrust, but is only procedural in nature.67
The upshot of the business judgment rule is strong judicial endorsement
of broad managerial discretion.68 The recent Disney case bears this out.69
Few cases in corporate law over the past decade have been as long-
awaited as the trial court opinion in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Liti-
gation.70 After an attention-grabbing pre-trial order in 2003 refused toS 71
dismiss a complaint alleging breach of good faith, the case went to trial
in late 2004. Chancellor William Chandler found for the defendants in
handing down his lengthy opinion in August 2005, the culmination to
what the Chancellor described as "a public spectacle. 72 In June 2006, the
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Chancellor Chandler's decision.73
The legal issue centered on whether the directors and certain executive
officers of the Disney Company had breached their fiduciary duties in
connection with the hiring and termination of Michael Ovitz as presi-
dent.74 Ovitz served as president for only about fourteen months, yet he
received approximately $130 million in severance compensation.7
Shareholders brought a derivative action in which they asserted, essen-
tially, breach of the fiduciary duties of due care and good faith in the way
the Disney directors and officers handled Ovitz's hiring and termina-
65. Id. at 453 (describing the business judgment rule as "the cornerstone concept in
the judicial review of corporate conduct").
66. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney), No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651,
at *31-33 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), affd, No. 411,2005, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8,
2006). Various policy rationales underlie the deference of the business judgment rule. See
Johnson, supra note 64, at 455-58.
67. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Due care in the decisionmaking
context is process due care only.").
68. Elhauge, supra note 24, at 770-75; see also Mark J. Roe, On Sacrificing Profits in
the Public Interest, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
OF FIRMs 88, 97 (Bruce L. Hay et al. eds., 2005) (concluding that "the business judgment
rule is probably central ... [in] giving managers ample discretion").
69. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651.
70. For example, a group of law professors was organized in advance of the opinion's
release to offer "instant" analysis. Posting of Gordon Smith to Conglomerate,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/conglomerateforumdisney/index.html (July 19, 2005).
71. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying
motion to dismiss), judgment entered for defendants, No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651
(Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), affd, No. 411,2005, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006).
72. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *2.
73. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 2006 WL 1562466, at *1.
74. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *1.
75. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 2006 WL 1562466, at *1.
[Vol. 56:1
Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory
tion.76 Due to a standard provision in the corporate charter absolving
directors of monetary liability for breaches of due care, the liability issue
turned on whether directors had fulfilled their obligation of good faith."
Chancellor Chandler reflected at length as to what good faith means,
but concluded that, on the Disney facts, it meant as one standard (not the
only one) that of not engaging in "intentional dereliction of duty" or a
"conscious disregard for one's responsibilities., 78 In applying that stan-
dard, Chancellor Chandler repeatedly rebuked the directors for how they
had proceeded in hiring and firing Ovitz. For example, the Chancellor
stated: "As I will explain in painful detail hereafter, there are many as-
pects of defendants' conduct that fell significantly short of the best prac-
tices of ideal corporate governance., 79 Noting the value of director short-
comings for providing an object lesson, Chancellor Chandler stated that
"many lessons of what not to do can be learned from defendants' conduct
here."8 Specifically, Chancellor Chandler highlighted Michael Eisner's
chief responsibility "for the failings in process that infected and handi-
capped the board's decisionmaking abilities,, 8' and observed that "the
board's collective kowtowing in regard to Ovitz's hiring is also due to
Eisner's desire to surround himself with yes men. '" And finally, though
Chancellor Chandler laced his opinion with additional harsh criticism, he
noted that "Eisner's actions ... should not serve as a model .... His
lapses were many .... [His] actions fall far short of what shareholders
expect and demand .... [and] do[] not comport with how fiduciaries of
Delaware corporations are expected to act." 3
For all the public scolding of Eisner, "especially at having enthroned
himself as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of his personal Magic
Kingdom,"' Chancellor Chandler concluded that Eisner had acted in
good faith, and had not acted with gross negligence.8' The basis for this
conclusion was a finding that Eisner met the legal standard because he
subjectively believed that his "actions were in the best interests of the
[c]ompany," and because his actions did "not represent a knowing viola-
76. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *1.
77. With respect to Michael Ovitz, there also was an issue as to whether he had dis-
charged the duty of loyalty, but Chancellor Chandler found Ovitz did not breach that duty,
id. at *37-38, a finding affirmed by the Supreme Court. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig.,
2006 WL 1562466, at *12-13.
78. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36.
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id. at *39.
81. Id. at *40.
82. Id. at *40 n.488.
83. Id. at *41.
84. Id.
85. Id.
2006]
Catholic University Law Review
tion of law or evidence a conscious and intentional disregard of duty.
86
A similar legal conclusion was reached as to every other director.87 In
affirming, the Supreme Court of Delaware approved Chancellor Chan-
dler's definition of good faith and quoted his reference to "'faithful-
ness,"' 88 but stated that it need go no further in elaborating on good
faith?
The Disney opinion demonstrates how relatively little is required of
corporate decision-makers to avoid breaching their fiduciary duties. It
reveals, as well, the vast gulf between what the law requires and what
shareholders and others in society expect and demand. In short, because
of the strong protection offered by the business judgment rule,
managerial discretion is only lightly regulated by the risk of legal sanc-
tion; and the opinion illustrates the broad scope of this discretion. What
influence then might guide and curb such far-ranging freedom?
III. FAITH AS CONSTRAINING AND GUIDING DISCRETION
This Part addresses what scholars say about the role of religious faith in
influencing decisions by senior corporate leaders. Selected non-legal
scholarship is first described and then the emergent scholarship on faith
in corporate law is examined. The former is a much more developed
body of scholarship.
A. Faith and Non-Legal Scholarship
Outside the legal academy, the role that religious faith can and does
play in influencing corporate decision-making has received thoughtful, if
limited, attention. Professors Helen Alford and Michael Naughton chal-
lenge the belief, engendered, they suggest, by the modern university,9°
that "faith is in a category completely separate from our work."91 They
begin by describing various models within the Catholic social tradition
for integrating faith and work, including what they call the natural law,
faith-based, and prophetic approaches. 9 They then offer a critique of
both the shareholder primacy and the stakeholder conceptions of corpo-
rate purpose.93 They criticize the former for focusing exclusively on a
86. Id.
87. Id. at *42-43, *47.
88. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., No. 411,2005, 2006 WL 1562466, at *27 (Del.
June 8, 2006) (quoting Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36).
89. Id.
90. HELEN J. ALFORD & MICHAEL J. NAUGHTON, MANAGING AS IF FAITH
MATTERED: CHRISTIAN SOCIAL PRINCIPLES IN THE MODERN ORGANIZATION 16-18
(2001).
91. Id. at 1.
92. Id. at 21-32.
93. Id. at 46-60.
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corporation's financial return. Such a focus, they argue, is rightly re-
garded as a foundational good, but should be considered primarily as a
means to higher, more excellent goods, not an end in itself.94 They criti-
cize the stakeholder model as simply adding additional groups whose
interests, along with shareholders, should be maximized by managers,
thereby ignoring the overall "common good." 95 After next developing
how corporate activity can contribute to spiritual development, 9 they
offer specific guidance on what job design, wages, corporate ownership,
and marketing would look like if shaped by Christian principles.97 In
short, these authors seek a principled, but practical, approach to blending
faith and corporate life at the senior management level.
Professor Laura Nash takes a more anthropological approach to inves-
tigating faith and business.98 Nash notes that, on the one hand, most dis-
cussions of secular business ethics neglect personal religious belief,99 and,
on the other hand, much of Christian religious thought ignores the corpo-
ration.1°° Nash interviewed over eighty-five evangelical Christian CEOs
and other top executives to learn how corporate managers understand
business responsibility in light of their Christian faith."" Classifying ex-
ecutives into three groups- generalists, justifiers, and seekers-Nash
found that the first two groups either ignore or rationalize potential con-
flicts between business demands and Christian ethics. '°2 The third type of
executive, the seeker, openly confronts the recurrent tension between the
demands of faith and business and, although rejecting business success as
the highest goal, seeks to guide the corporation to economic success while
doing so in a way that is one more expression of religious convictions.
94. Id. at 46-49.
95. Id. at 55-57. Dean Sargent also contrasts the common good as articulated in a
communitarian vision of the corporation with an approach that merely mediates stake-
holder interests. Sargent, Competing Visions, supra note 17, at 570 n.21.
96. ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 90, at 70-95.
97. Id. at 99-100, 125-26, 152-53, 177-78; see also RETHINKING THE PURPOSE OF
BUSINESS: INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS FROM THE CATHOLIC SOCIAL TRADITION (S.A.
Cortright & Michael J. Naughton eds., 2002); BUSINESS AS A CALLING:
INTERDISCIPLINARY ESSAYS ON THE MEANING OF BUSINESS FROM THE CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TRADITION (Michael J. Naughton & Stephanie Rumpza eds., 2005).
98. NASH, supra note 16.
99. Id. at ix. Professor Timothy Fort also believes that "[t]he field of business ethics
has not paid sufficient attention to the questions of why a person would want to be ethi-
cal." Timothy L. Fort, Religious Belief, Corporate Leadership, and Business Ethics, 33 AM.
BUS. L.J. 451, 452 (1996). He also observes that "[m]any people believe that religious
convictions have no appropriate role in business decision making." Id. at 451.
100. NASH, supra note 16, at 29.
101. Id. at xii. For recent examples of how top corporate managers mix business and
faith, see Phred Dvorak, Managing by the (Good) Book, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2006, at B1.
102. NASH, supra note 16, at 40, 44-45.
103. Id. at 45-47.
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Nash found that this effort to blend faith and work led to more meaning-
ful work experiences for the individuals themselves, higher ethical stan-
dards, and more humane employee practices at the company level. °"
Drawing on the work of Professor Nash, as well as the scholarship of
theologian Max Stackhouse, Dennis McCann, and others, Kihyoung Shin,
working in the Christian Reformed tradition, has developed a "covenan-
tal interpretation" of the corporation.' °5 Shin contrasts a covenantal un-
derstanding of corporations with the widely accepted contractarian the-
ory, arguing that a covenantal interpretation is superior. °6 The two mod-
els differ in their perception of social relations (emphasizing moral com-
mitment to others versus a focus on calculative self-interest), and in as-
sumptions about human nature (relational versus autonomous and self-
defining).'7 Ultimately, Shin believes a covenantal model both better
situates the corporation in a wider social context and more promisingly
links corporate endeavor to widely shared beliefs about social purpose,
moral values, and religious belief.' 8 In short, to paraphrase a favorite
metaphor of orthodox corporate law theory, Shin advocates a conception
of corporateness understood more as "nexus of covenants" than "nexus
of contracts."
Recently, Marc Gunther, a senior writer for Fortune magazine, sought
to chronicle how faith and spiritual values have influenced such compa-
nies as UPS, Timberland, Starbucks, Southwest Airlines, and Herman
Miller.' 9 Gunther adopts a considerably broader conception of faith than
do Alford and Naughton, Nash, and Shin, noting that some business lead-
ers have faith in God, while others do not."° He believes, however, that
senior leadership in the companies he studied are all guided by spiritual
values, which he defines as "a set of beliefs that are shared by the world's
great religious traditions.' Gunther's ecumenical definition of faith
encompasses a broad set of companies where managers are guided by his
inclusive notion, though for persons seeking to live from more fixed and
particularized religious conviction, his conception may be too thin to be
of much individual guidance. Still, the company stories do show the leav-
104. Id. at xv.
105. KIHYOUNG SHIN, THE COVENANTAL INTERPRETATION OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION 1-3 (2001). Nash briefly addresses a covenantal approach as well. NASH,
supra note 16, at 95-99.
106. SHIN, supra note 105, at viii.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Id.
109. GUNTHER, supra note 16.
110. Id. at 1.
111. Id at4.
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ening effect that a focus on non-economic values can have in corporate
culture."2
What lies unspoken beneath these, and other,"3 efforts to explore the
relationship of faith and the corporation is the assumption that managers
possess sufficient discretion to make moral choices. A recent article by
Professors Christine Hemingway and Patrick Maclagan makes explicit
the fact that managerial discretion is the critical avenue by which per-
sonal moral values can shape corporate conduct toward greater social
responsibility, whether those values are grounded in religious conviction
or other sources of moral authority.14 The presence or absence of discre-
tion, therefore, is essential to whether managers can draw on religious
faith to shape corporate policy. Since, as shown in Part II, it is clearly
settled in corporate law that managers possess broad discretion, has cor-
porate law theory acknowledged how faith might influence its exercise?
B. Faith and Corporate Law Scholarship
Unlike the case with scholarship in the business and business ethics
fields, very little corporate law scholarship examines the corporation
from a religious vantage point. Recently, a few scholars working from a
Catholic social thought perspective have connected religious outlook to
issues raised by the business corporation."5 The general lack of attention
to the role of religious faith in corporate law is surprising, given that cor-
porate law, like other areas of law, has been assessed from a host of other
standpoints." 6 Much of the "silence" in corporate scholarship may, as
noted earlier, 7 simply stem from a lack of interest in religion on the part
of legal scholars or from a belief that religion is irrelevant to modern cor-
porate theory. It may also reflect adherence to a "norm" among legal
academics generally, to the effect that religion and legal scholarship do
not mix. Professor Vincent Di Lorenzo studied legal literature on corpo-
rate social responsibility for the period from 1995 to 2000 and found that
a mere three of forty-four articles discussed the viewpoints of religious
groups and leaders, only one of which was written by a writer with a legal
112. Interestingly, Gunther describes an earlier article he wrote about the Walt Disney
Company, in which he "argued that Michael Eisner's leadership style ... damaged the
company, its employees and its shareholders." Id. at 15.
113. Cf Fort, supra note 99, at 452-53.
114. Hemingway and Maclagan, supra note 35, at 39; see also Michael Bommer et al., A
Behavioral Model of Ethical and Unethical Decision Making, 6 J. Bus. ETHICs 265, 268
(1987) ("[M]anagerial decisions will correspond more closely to the humanistic, religious,
cultural, and societal values of society-at-large only when these values are made part of the
job environment.").
115. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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background."' Di Lorenzo concludes that religious viewpoints in corpo-
rate law "are either overlooked or deliberately ignored.""' 9 His findings
confirm what Professor William Stuntz, at a more general level, has noted
about legal discourse: "It is probably fair to describe the conventional
wisdom among legal academics as follows: religious convictions should be
kept out of debates about law and politics .... ,, 0
Dean Mark Sargent and Professors Susan Stabile, Scott Fitzgibbon, and
Stephen Bainbridge recently have begun considering the relevance of
Catholicism to corporate law.121 Stabile has explored how religion-not
simply Christianity -might be used to promote corporate responsibil-
ity,2 and she separately has sketched a "Catholic vision" of the corpora-
tion."'3 In the former article, Stabile explicitly argues for the role of law
in mandating certain "responsible" corporate conduct.' 24  To do that
without "attempting to claim that the belief system of any one particular
religion should hold sway,"' ' she canvasses religious thought broadly to
find what "is common to many religions.' 2 6 Her aim is to develop a
somewhat general, but religiously grounded, view of human personhood
and human relations. In her "vision" piece,'27 she works more directly
from Catholic tradition in suggesting both direct legal regulation and
non-law alternatives for gaining more socially responsible conduct.
Stabile's work contributes importantly in linking religion and corporate
law. At the same time, the first article suffers from the need to be gen-
eral and non-denominational in order to obtain sufficient political con-
sensus to pass, or at least allay concerns about, the legislation Stabile
seeks. This need (or desire) to appeal to many faith traditions may,
ironically, make Stabile's approach less compelling to adherents of any
particular religion, each such religion having what philosopher George
118. Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Legislative and Public Policy Debate: Should the Social
Viewpoints of Religious Groups Play No Role?, 1 MARGINS 489, 490-91 (2001).
119. Id. at 492.
120. William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1707, 1711 (2003)
(book review).
121. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also Scott Fitzgibbon, "True Human
Community": Catholic Social Thought, Aristotelean Ethics, and the Moral Order of the
Business Company, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1243, 1267-68 (2001) (contrasting the utility-
affiliation and the closely-bonded types of companies).
122. Stabile, Using Religion, supra note 17, at 846-47.
123. Stabile, Catholic Vision, supra note 17, at 181.
124. Stabile, Using Religion, supra note 17, at 879 & n.157 ("My focus, here ... is on
the role of the law.").
125. Id. at 896.
126. Id.; see also id. at 895 n.227 ("[T]he religious view I espouse here... is fundamen-
tal to so many world religions.").
127. Stabile, Catholic Vision, supra note 17, at 181.
128. Stabile, Using Religion, supra note 17, at 879-81. In the United States, however, a
Christian majority could probably pass her proposed legislation.
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Santayana called "a marked idiosyncrasy. 12 9 Moreover, as will be devel-
oped later, no changes in positive law are needed to introduce religious
perspectives into corporate law. Managerial discretion today is broad
enough to enable religious beliefs to shape corporate conduct. Unlike
Stabile, who seeks more from the law, i.e., legislative expression of gen-
eral religious views, this author seeks nothing new from the law, asking
only that law not forbid giving free voice to particular religious views
within corporate law and practice as they now exist. The difference stems
from a belief that it is not law-where managerial discretion is broad,
though still constrained by fiduciary duties-that silences the religious
voice within corporations. Rather, it is the secularization of corporate
law discourse itself, along with social norms and linguistic practices within
corporations themselves, that hinder free expression and therefore need
reforming.
Dean Sargent has offered both a Catholic critique of law and econom-
ics and a comparison of competing Catholic conceptions of corporate-
ness.3 ° In the latter work, he criticizes Michael Novak's work as overly
concerned with economic liberty and as wrongly regarding wealth maxi-
mization as the sole legitimate goal in the economic sphere. 3' He finds
less rigidity in Bainbridge's work'132-even though Bainbridge is a firm
proponent of a contractarian conception of corporateness, descriptively,
and the goal of shareholder wealth maximization, prescriptively1 33 - and
even though Bainbridge rejects communitarianism and finds little of
promise for corporate law in Catholic social thought.' 34 According to
Sargent, Bainbridge perceptively holds that the calculative, self-interest
maximizing conduct ascribed to humans by law and economics scholars
describes people as they really are-i.e., "fallen" and sinful-not as they
can or should be.135 Sargent objects, however, that Bainbridge's assess-
ment neglects the possibility of redemption, a central teaching of the
Christian faith.36
Sargent, like Stabile, holds out more hope than Bainbridge that Catho-
lic social thought can contribute to more socially responsible corporate
129. GEORGE SANTAYANA, Reason in Religion, in THE LIFE OF REASON 179, 180
(Charles Scribner's Sons 1954). Santayana also stated, just before the phrase quoted in the
text, that: "The attempt to speak without speaking any particular language is not more
hopeless than the attempt to have a religion that shall be no religion in particular." Id.
130. See generally Sargent, Utility, supra note 17; Sargent, Competing Visions, supra
note 17.
131. Sargent, Competing Visions, supra note 17, at 574-81.
132. Id. at 581-88.
133. See Bainbridge, Apologia, supra note 17, at 209.
134. Bainbridge, Bishops, supra note 17, at 15-16.
135. Sargent, Utility, supra note 17, at 47-48.
136. See id. at 51.
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conduct.13 7 Nonetheless, he realistically acknowledges "how difficult it is
to derive specific guidance from [Catholic social thought]'s theological
propositions and moral norms for corporate law." '138 He appreciates that
"a [Catholic social thought]/communitarian version of corporate law is
yet to emerge."'39 The challenge ahead, Sargent believes, is to "provide a
means for moving from the general to the specific. '"'40
The remainder of this Article responds to that challenge and provides a
way forward. The concept of faithfulness developed here offers, first, a
means for being more specific about how to connect faith and the corpo-
ration, but does not purport to provide the only means; nor does it derive
from Catholic social thought. Second, it works within corporate law as it
is, seeking, unlike Stabile, no reform of positive law; it seeks, instead, a
new understanding of what current law both requires and permits, espe-
cially after the recent Disney decision. Those desiring introduction of
religious voice into corporate theory and practice need less from the law
than Stabile asks, and already have more in the law than Bainbridge al-
lows. Third, the approach offered here honors the reality of managerial
discretion by leaving to corporate decision-makers themselves, and their
legal counsel-not legislators-the task of deciding whether and how to
translate legal responsibilities into specific courses of action based on
religious belief. This less hierarchical means for leavening corporate law
with religious outlook is not only more politically pragmatic at this junc-
ture, it also is more decentralized and eclectic in approach than that of
Stabile. At the same time, this approach is fully congruent with the prin-
ciple of "subsidiarity, '142 and with what Dean Sargent has observed about
papal documents and bishops' statements: "They also usually avoid mak-
137. Bainbridge cautions that "the rules must not be defined in ways that effectively
require every citizen to be a practicing Christian." Bainbridge, Apologia, supra note 17, at
222. He also objects to the teachings of Catholic social thought as having "a strong statist
slant." Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights of Em-
ployees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 809 (1998).
Bainbridge's concern about "rules" and statist" approaches assumes legal imposition, a
predicate relevant to Stabile's proposal but not to the approach advocated in this Article.
138. Sargent, Competing Visions, supra note 17, at 593.
139. Id. at 592.
140. Id. at 593.
142. As stated in a 1986 letter by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops:
"[G]overnment should undertake only those initiatives which exceed the capacity of indi-
viduals or private groups acting independently." NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC
BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL
TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 62 (1986).
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ing specific policy recommendations, recognizing the hierarchy's limited
expertise, leaving questions of application to the prudential judgment and
moral discernment of the laity.',
143
IV. THE DUTY OF FAITHFULNESS
How might the religious perspective be introduced into corporate law
and practice without legislating it, as Stabile advocates, or relying on
sheer volunteerism? This Part suggests that the concept of faithfulness,
recently invoked by both Chancellor Chandler and the Supreme Court of
Delaware in the Disney opinion,'" is a rich, evocative term that, having
currency both in the legal sphere and in the larger social-moral realm,
invites corporate decision-making to be informed by religious faith. Be-
fore developing the argument, and to provide a richer context for the
argument, the way in which corporate theory treats managerial discretion
will be briefly addressed.
A. Curbing Managerial Discretion
As noted earlier, corporate theorists do not disagree on the existence
of significant managerial discretion, though they do disagree on its extent
and what, if anything, to do about it.' 45 Many scholars, especially those
deeply influenced by neo-classical economics, believe that, except per-
haps in regulating the hostile takeover market, the law permits competi-
tive forces within markets to work fairly well to limit the abuse of discre-
tion.'"6 These markets include not only product, service, labor, and capi-S. 147
tal markets, but also the "market" for law, that is, rivalry among states
for corporate charters, as influenced by the threat of federal interven-
tion.148 To compete effectively in these various markets, the argument
goes, managers must maximize profits and take good care of sharehold-
ers. 49 Many theorists, believing such market forces fail to fully constrain
the undesirable use of discretion, advocate government regulation of
various kinds.' 0 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is just one especially prominent
and recent example of this approach.' Where specific regulation exists,
143. Sargent, Competing Visions, supra note 17, at 563.
144. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
145. See supra Part II.B.
146. Roe, supra note 29, at 1252 (stating that articles in recent symposiums of which his
is a part "fit this tradition").
147. See id. at 1254.
148. For a recent treatment of competition in the production of corporate law, see
Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2491 (2005).
149. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 4-5.
150. See, e.g., Stabile, Using Religion, supra note 17, at 879-80.
151. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 15, 18 & 28 U.S.C.). For a description of that important federal legisla-
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companies must comply with the particular mandates of law, but that is
all. Other theorists, including some market-centered scholars, acknowl-
edge the need for the law to impose fiduciary duties on corporate deci-
sion-makers to inhibit undesirable conduct not subject to precise ex ante
delineation.112 Finally, the important role of non-legal, social, and moral
norms in shaping corporate conduct has been recognized.'53 Here, more
than compliance with the minimal demands of positive law is expected;
compliance with prevailing social conventions also comes into play. For
this Article, the role of fiduciary duties and norms in shaping managerial
behavior is especially important.
B. Norms and Fiduciary Duties
1. Norms
Professor Elhauge recently developed a way in which social and moral
norms augment economic and legal constraints in business, stating that
"optimizing conduct has always required supplementing legal and eco-
nomic sanctions with social and moral processes .... [T]hese processes
work by subjecting business owners to the usual set of social and moral
sanctions that attend antisocial behavior even when it is legal.' ,154 In the
corporate structure, shareholders of public companies are largely insu-
lated from the full working of these processes, due to a lack of informa-
tion necessary for moral guilt and through enjoying an anonymity that
screens them from exposure to social sanctions.15  Consequently, corpo-
rate managers, by being responsive to social and moral sanctions, can
counteract shareholder immunity to such sanctions. Many corporate
managers, according to Elhauge, do in fact temper a full-bored share-
holder wealth maximization approach to corporate decisions by weighing
the interests of various non-shareholders as well. 156 This view both coun-
tenances managerial discretion and makes it imperative that to channel
such discretion in a socially desirable manner, managers appropriately
decipher, reflect, and respond to the influence of a society's social and
moral norms.
Societies differ, of course, both as to what norms hold wide influence
and as to the source and strength of those norms. In the United States,
tion and how it may influence state corporate law, see Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A.
Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149
(2004).
152. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 90-93.
153. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law,
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1640-41 (2002).
154. Elhauge, supra note 24, at 797.
155. Id. at 798-99.
156. Id. at 803-04.
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both historically and currently, religious faith has played, and still plays, a
significant role in shaping social, moral, and even political outlook."' As
recently noted by Professor Noah Feldman: "Secularists must accept the
fact that religious values form an important source of political beliefs and
identities for the majority of Americans.' 158
Within the business world, religious convictions also play a meaningful
role in guiding business decisions for many people. 9 Certainly nothing
in law prohibits that practice, but, likewise, nothing mandates it either. It
simply is permitted. It would seem, then, that the appropriateness of
drawing on such convictions is itself likely to be influenced both by social
norms as to the propriety of linking faith and business and by personal
moral convictions. If drawing on religious beliefs-and saying so-is
socially approved (or, at least, is accepted), it is more likely to be done
than if it is frowned upon. Even if socially frowned on, persons who be-
lieve that their convictions require appropriate expression in business
may draw on them notwithstanding social stigma.
Currently, though we probably know less about this than we should,
the predominant mode of discourse within most business circles is a
highly secular discourse. Certainly, the prevailing discourse in corporate
legal theory is decidedly secular. This would seem, both in practice and
in theory, to leave the invocation of faith, as a factor germane to making
and justifying business decisions, wholly within the discretion of the indi-
vidual, to be guided solely by the individual's understanding of prevailing
social norms and the demands of personal moral-religious beliefs them-
selves. One limiting factor, however, on this highly individualistic ac-
count of how faith might bear on corporate law and practice is the man-
date of fiduciary duties; specifically, the question of how faith itself might
influence one's understanding of binding fiduciary duties.
2. Fiduciary Duties
Corporate decision-makers cannot exercise their discretion in whatever
way they want. Even apart from the constraints imposed by market
forces, specific legal regulation, and social-moral norms, directors and
officers are subject to the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. The duty
of care, admittedly, constrains corporate decision-makers rather loosely,
at least as to the legal sanction of damages.' 6 For corporate directors
157. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
158. FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 251.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 98-111.
160. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate
Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 30-31 & n.11 (2003) (explaining that breaches of the duty of
care do not lead to damages under most corporate statutes).
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ee. x162(but not officers),16' care is process-oriented, lacks substantive content,162
and, since the mid-1980s, its breach is unlikely to result in money dam-
ages due to widespread statutory exculpation.l6u That leaves only the
duty of loyalty to serve as a meaningful constraint on managerial discre-
tion, at least ex post. Many scholars and courts, however, emphasize only
the "negative" dimension of loyalty, that is, the aspect that forbids be-
trayal.'64 The affirmative dimension of loyalty, that is, the thrust that also
mandates devotion to corporate interests, is often neglected. 65 This legal
rendering of loyalty as mere nonbetrayal is, of course, considerably nar-
rower than the richer historical and social-moral understanding of that
notion. Read narrowly, loyalty in corporate law too often serves only to
prohibit improper conflicts of interest and wrongful use or misappropria-
tion of corporate information or opportunities, not mandate affirmatively
advancing corporate well-being.
With the duty of care lacking legal "bite," and the duty of loyalty
largely limited to policing self-dealing conduct, the role of fiduciary du-
ties in curbing managerial discretion seemed in jeopardy in the 1990s.
This led Delaware courts and corporate scholars to explore whether the
notion of good faith might cover a broader range of misconduct than loy-
alty,' 66 while offering, unlike care, the prospect of money damages as a
remedy for its breach. 67 Interest in good faith, whether as a stand-alone
fiduciary duty or as a component of the duty of loyalty, rose greatly in
2003, when Chancellor Chandler denied a motion to dismiss the com-
plaint in the Disney case,'6 where breach of good faith was the central
claim. The case went to trial for thirty-seven days in late 2004, and Chan-
161. Much confusion exists as to how and why officer duties might differ from those of
directors. See generally Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate
Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597 (2005) (differentiating director
and officer duties).
162. See supra text accompanying note 67.
163. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 31 & nn.11-12. Directors, but not officers, typi-
cally are exculpated by these statutes. But see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2006) (per-
mitting exculpation of both officers and directors).
164. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 34-35.
165. A few cases in Delaware capture the affirmative demands of loyalty. See id. at 36,
56-59.
166. See id. at 37-39, 48-50.
167. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Cor-
porate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 13-15 (2005); E. Norman Veasey with Christine
T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-
2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1439-54
(2005) (reviewing decisional law and scholarship); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv.
Litig., No. 411,2005, 2006 WL 1562466, at *34 & n.99 (Del. June 8, 2006) (collecting recent
scholarship on good faith).
168. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying
motion to dismiss), judgment entered for defendants, No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651
(Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), affd, No. 411,2005,2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8,2006).
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cellor Chandler issued his long-awaited (and lengthy) opinion on August
9, 2005.69
Chancellor Chandler entered judgment for the defendants on all
claims 7° He wrote an opinion that, as noted earlier, severely criticized
defendants and catalogued their distressing departure from corporate
"best practices.''. He also discussed social norms,'72 urged directors and
officers to employ best practices,' and, importantly, elaborated on the
notion of "good faith.' 74 In doing so, he invoked, repeatedly, the words
"faithful" and "faithfulness."' '75 The evocative term "faithfulness," refer-
enced by both the chancery court and the supreme court, may provide a
linguistic entry point for allowing decision-makers to discharge legal du-
ties while drawing on faith-based understandings of those duties.
C. Faithfulness
In his five-page introduction, Chancellor Chandler used the word
"faithful" (or "faithfully") five times,'76 once as part of the phrase "faith-
ful servants."'77 He expressly premised the "wide latitude" given to cor-
porate decision-makers by corporate law on those actors acting "faith-
fully."
78
The heart of Chancellor Chandler's opinion addressed the issue of
whether each of the defendants had acted in good faith under Delaware
law. Before measuring their conduct against that standard, he sought to
explain what good faith meant in the fiduciary duty context. "9 The issue
169. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig. (Disney), No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651,
at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), affd, No. 411,2005, 2006 WL 1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006).
The trial court's slip opinion is 174 pages and contains 591 footnotes.
170. Id. at *52.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84.
172. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *1-2.
173. Id. at *1.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 177-96.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 177-96. The Supreme Court of Delaware
quoted approvingly Chancellor Chandler's description of "'good faith"' as requiring
"'faithfulness."' In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 2006 WL 1562466, at *27 (quoting
Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36).
176. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *1-2.
177. Id. at *2. This famous phrase, now widely used in common parlance, is found in
biblical teaching on being faithful. See Matthew 25:21, 23 (New International); see also 1
Corinthians 4:2 (New International). For example, President Bush recently described
former Pope John Paul II as "'a good and faithful servant of God."' Daniel Williams &
Alan Cooperman, John Paul II Dies at 84, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2005, at Al.
178. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *1. The following discussion will focus on the chan-
cery court opinion because it provides a fuller treatment of faithfulness and because the
supreme court upheld, in a briefer discussion, Chancellor Chandler's definition of good
faith and quoted his reference to "'faithfulness."' In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 2006
WL 1562466, at *27 (quoting Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36).
179. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *35.
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arose because of a basic awkwardness in Delaware's doctrinal constructs
on the subject of corporate fiduciary duties. On the one hand, Delaware
long has recognized that directors owe two fiduciary duties, those of due
care and loyalty.'O On the other hand, the Delaware business judgment
rule, the key analytical tool used in judicially reviewing fiduciary conduct,
while not itself a substantive rule of law, is phrased as a "presumption
that... directors.., acted ... in good faith.' 181 In addition, the Delaware
statute permitting exculpation of directors from liability for money dam-
ages expressly excepts from permissible exculpation director conduct
"not in good faith., 182 Thus, the relationship of good faith to care and
loyalty has emerged as a key issue in Delaware jurisprudence.
Chancellor Chandler acknowledged that Delaware decisions "are far
from clear with respect to whether there is a separate fiduciary duty of
good faith,"'83 and characterized the law as "[s]hrouded in the fog of...
hazy jurisprudence."'' 84 In seeking to harmonize these fiduciary concepts,
Chancellor Chandler asserted that good faith must be understood as "in-
separably and necessarily intertwined with the duties of care and loy-
alty."' ' After offering various nonexclusive renderings of good faith,'8
Chancellor Chandler, acknowledging that "a definitive and categorical
definition" of good faith "would be difficult, if not impossible,1 i 7 de-
scribed good faith as requiring "honesty of purpose [and acting] in the
best interests ... of the corporation.', 88 He also stated that "intentional
dereliction of duty [or] a conscious disregard for one's responsibilities, is
an appropriate (although not the only) standard for.., good faith.,
189
Chancellor Chandler did not stop with these rather modest assertions,
however. In a fascinating tour de force, the Chancellor conceptually re-
ordered the relationship between care, loyalty, and good faith. He recast
the traditional duties of care and loyalty as
but constituent elements of the overarching concepts of alle-
giance, devotion and faithfulness that must guide the conduct of
every fiduciary. The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary
includes not simply the duties of care and loyalty, in the narrow
180. Id. at *31.
181. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984).
182. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 31 n.12 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (2000).
183. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *35.
184. Id. The Supreme Court of Delaware noted that colorful description. In re Walt
Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., No. 411,2005, 2006 WL 1562466, at *24 & n.98 (Del. June 8,
2006).
185. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *31.
186. Id. at *35-36.
187. Id. at *36.
188. Id.
189. Id. (emphasis omitted).
[Vol. 56:1
Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory
sense that I have discussed them above, but all actions required
by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.'
Shortly thereafter, he again subsumed care and loyalty under good
faith, referring to "the loyalty or care aspects of good faith."'' Chancel-
lor Chandler elaborated further on the idea of faithfulness as the over-
arching hallmark of good faith when he described Michael Eisner's con-
duct.'9 Appreciating that care is process-oriented and that loyalty is fre-
quently understood as only having the negative dimension of forbidding
conflicts of interests, he worried that such duties, traditionally under-
stood, "may not be aggressive enough to protect shareholder interests."' 93
Good faith, he noted, may "fill this gap" between care and loyalty.' 4 Cit-
ing an article by this author arguing that loyalty should be understood
more expansively to require affirmative attention and devotion,'9 Chan-
cellor Chandler noted that such a conception would "fit comfortably
within the concept of good faith (or vice versa) as a constituent element
of the overarching concept of faithfulness. '"' 96
What emerges, repeatedly, is the concept of faithfulness, understood as
"devotion" and "allegiance," as well as its opposite, the notion of faith-
less conduct.'9 Chancellor Chandler himself, in an earlier opinion, had
described a fiduciary's obligation of "remaining faithful to the fiduciary
duties owed."' 98 His predecessor, William Allen, also had referred to
faithful (and faithless) conduct,' 99 as had Vice Chancellor Noble,20° ViceChancllor " "201
Chancellor Strine, and the Delaware Supreme Court itself.20 2 While
more will be learned about the contours of this emerging concept of faith-
fulness in future cases, it seems clear, after the Delaware Supreme
Court's affirmance in Disney, that Delaware directors are subject to more
than just the traditional demands of care and loyalty. They now are re-
190. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court prominently quoted this language in its opin-
ion. In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., No. 411,2005, 2006 WL 1562466, at *27 (Del. June
8, 2006).
191. Disney, 2005 WL 2056651, at *36 n.463.
192. See id. at *39-41.
193. Id. at *40 n.487.
194. Id.
195. Id. (citing Johnson, supra note 160).
196. Id. (citing Johnson, supra note 160).
197. Id. at *36.
198. Baring v. Condrell, No. Civ.A. 516-N, 2004 WL 2340047, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18,
2004).
199. In re Caremark Int'l. Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
200. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins,
No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,2004).
201. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 & n.34-35 (Del. Ch. 2003).
202. Beam ex reL Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1048-49 & n.16 (Del. 2004).
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quired to act with faithfulness, and corporate lawyers must now so advise
directors.23
To what source(s) will lawyers and decision-makers turn for enlight-
enment? The legal concept of faithfulness certainly cannot be under-
stood by self-reference. Nor is faithfulness a well-developed idea in other
areas of secular law, to which corporate law could look for meaningful
guidance. Rather, the richest, most fully formed understandings of
"faithfulness" are likely to be drawn from non-legal sources. Upon being
advised that one is under a legal duty to act with faithfulness'0 or that
one must be faithful or devoted to the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, directors can bring to these evocative legal terms
their own rich and varied recollection of faithfulness, as drawn from
teaching, literature, drama, and religious texts and instruction where that
concept is portrayed. By infusing the notion of faithfulness with moral
instruction gained from religious faith, for example, directors may more
clearly see the performance of their responsibilities as involving a moral
as well as a legal obligation. The result may be that they act in a way that
exceeds the minimum level needed to avoid legal sanction, striving also to
fulfill a higher moral charge.
V. FAITH INFORMING FAITHFULNESS
Fiduciary duties retain a moral and spiritual quality even in the highly
secularized discourse of twenty-first century corporate law.205 The Latin
root of fiduciary-"fides"-means "faith," as in trust, reliability, or faith-
fulness, not as in religious faith.20 It is fitting, therefore, for both judges
and legal counsel to remind corporate fiduciaries that they must act faith-
fully. Moreover, to the extent that religious faith traditions make faith-
fulness a moral teaching, they can offer substantial guidance on the
meaning of faithful managerial conduct and its importance to a healthy
203. The role of lawyers in transmitting judicial rulings (and other legal developments)
to directors and officers is critical. This author has gathered empirical data as to what
lawyers say to officers about fiduciary duties. See Lyman Johnson & Rob Ricca, (Not)
Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. (forth-
coming 2007).
204. Incoming members of the Board of Trustees at the author's home institution are
required to take an oath of office wherein they swear that they "will faithfully discharge
the duties of the office to which I have been elected." Board of Trustees Oath of Office,
Washington and Lee University (on file with author).
205. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795,829-30 (1983) ("Courts regu-
late fiduciaries by imposing a high standard of morality upon them. This moral theme is an
important part of fiduciary law. Loyalty, fidelity, faith, and honor form its basic vocabu-
lary.").
206. E-mail from Kevin M. Crotty, Professor of Classics, Washington & Lee Univ. to
author (Sept. 13, 2005) (on file with author). Fides was a Roman goddess, considered the
deification of faith and honesty. Id.
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corporate ethos.20 As an example, the Christian faith gives this quality a
prominent place in ethical conduct, and recalling what it says can refresh
a director's or officer's understanding of the moral imperative lying be-
neath a secular concept.
208
A. Biblical Teaching on Faithfulness
The Bible itself says it is to be looked to for instruction.209 Thus, be-
lievers should turn to the Bible for an understanding of faithfulness. The
Bible describes God himself as being faithful."O Moreover, in several
places, it commands the quality of human faithfulness toward others. In
Jesus' "Parable of the Shrewd Manager,, 21' in his "Parable of the Tal-
ents, '1 as well as in his story of the faithful servant,1  Jesus makes clear
that when working for another, or when entrusted with another's prop-
erty, "faithfulness" is highly valued. Interestingly, the famous teaching
on not being able to serve two masters2 4-a passage that undergirds the
fiduciary duty of loyalty and which was regularly cited by judges into the
211
early twentieth century -immediately follows a strong teaching on the
207. This assumes, of course, that believers within a faith tradition understand its core
moral teachings. More than one commentator has expressed concern that, even though
the United States is a religious country, too few Americans "can engage with any sophisti-
cation in biblically inflected arguments" because too many citizens are "religious illiter-
ates." Stephen Prothero, Op-Ed, A Nation of Religious Illiterates, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Jan. 20, 2005, at 9.
208. Addressing the need to recall the "moral core" of the corporation, theologian Max
Stackhouse stated:
What then is the moral core of the corporation? It is not in economics, nor alone
in the relative efficiencies it can introduce. It is in the ethos, and it appears in the
practices of many who live according to the deepest principles already incarnate in
business. But these practices themselves are framed by theological and social forces
that are extrinsic and prior to business. The guidance of modem economic systems,
the renewal of our political economy, the moral fabric of the twenty-first century to-
ward which we are limping and lurching will depend in substantial measure on
whether we can grasp and refresh the theological foundations on which the ethos and
these practices rest-especially since they have now become nearly universal in secu-
lar form, without consciousness of their moral and spiritual roots. Without this con-
sciousness, the roots dry up; Baal triumphs and Mammon wins-at least for a mo-
ment. But with this guidance, the moral and spiritual foundations for moral business
practice can become self-conscious and thereby self-critical and self-reconstructive
once more, to the glory of God.
Max L. Stackhouse, The Moral Roots of the Corporation, 5 THEOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 29,
38 (1993).
209. 2 Timothy 3:16 (New International).
210. See, e.g., Psalm 36:5 (New International); Isaiah 25:1 (New International).
211. Luke 16:1-13 (King James).
212. Matthew 25:14-30 (New International).
213. Luke 12:35-48 (New International).
214. Luke 16:13 (King James).
215. See Johnson, supra note 160, at 53 n.150.
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216quality of faithfulness. This provides a fascinating historical antecedent
to Chancellor Chandler's subsuming of loyalty within the overarching
concept of faithfulness. The Apostle Paul also lauds the faithful stew-
ard,217 and describes "faithfulness" as one of the "fruit[s]" of the Holy
Spirit.218 Faithfulness in biblical teaching, therefore, although described
as a spiritual quality, is to be manifested in practical allegiance to the in-
terests of another.2 9 The stance of faithfulness toward others is to grow
out of a more general stance of unselfishness in relating to others, also
taught by the Bible.
B. Biblical Teaching on Serving Others
As corporate leaders recall biblical teachings on faithfulness, they can
recall as well that Christianity (and other religions) has a great deal to say
about interacting with others. Better understanding what faith traditions
say about faithfulness can usher in the habit of more frequently looking
to faith for moral guidance in business. In Christianity, for example, be-
lievers are taught not to pursue only their self-interest,2'0 or to love
money.22' Instead, believers are commanded to love their neighbor as
much as themselves,2 2 and pointedly are told to seek the good of others.
These qualities of unselfishness and compassion are clearly taught in the
"Parable of the Good Samaritan,"'22 and in the "Parable of the Unmerci-
216. Luke 16:1-12 (King James).
217. 1 Corinthians 4:2 (New International).
218. Galatians 5:22-23 (New International).
219. For example, the Proverbs, designed to give guidance for practical living, describe
the straightforward honesty of a faithful friend. Proverbs 27:6 (New International). Also,
in his teaching on "The Wise and Foolish Builders," Jesus said that the person "who hears
these words of mine and puts them into practice is like a wise man who built his house on
the rock." Matthew 7:24 (New International).
220. 1 Corinthians 10:24 (New International); Philippians 2:4 (New International). As
philosopher Samuel Gregg reminds us, Christians need to be careful in thinking about self-
interest:
We thus see that the issue of self-interest is more complex than one might initially
suppose. Self-interest need not necessarily be equated with selfishness. Here Chris-
tians may have something to learn from Jewish and Muslim traditions, neither of
which tends to cast quite the negative light upon the term self-interest as do some
Christians. In these traditions, Michael Novak reminds us, self-interest is understood
as a commonsense duty to oneself. In this context, the Christian commandment to
"Love thy neighbor as oneself' assumes new meaning. A fundamental and proper
love of self is no cause for moral unease.
SAMUEL GREGG, ECONOMIC THINKING FOR THE THEOLOGICALLY MINDED 15 (2001)
(footnote omitted).
221. See, e.g., 1 Timothy 6:9-10 (New International).
222. A Christian is commanded to "[ilove your neighbor as yourself." Matthew 22:39
(New International); see Ashford, supra note 17, at 4-5 (elaborating on the "essential prin-
ciples of Christianity").
223. Luke 10:25-37 (New International).
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ful Servant. 2 24 They apply in the work setting-work being regarded by
God as good 22 -where believers are to work as though working for
God, 26 and are to treat servants (employees) rightly and fairly.227 These
teachings show that, although Christians believe humankind to be, as
Bainbridge notes, fallen, nonetheless, kind, redemptive behavior to-
ward others is both possible and required, as Dean Sargent urges.229
Moreover, humans are not to regard themselves as self-made and
autonomous, but instead, they should appreciate how they are vitally
connected to, and dependent on, other people in their lives.23°
VI. ENRICHING CORPORATE THEORY AND PRACTICE WITH RELIGIOUS
DISCOURSE
If persons serving as directors and officers sincerely hold religious be-
liefs, whether drawn from a Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, or Bud-
dhist outlook, it would be odd if those deepest, most meaningful convic-
tions did not influence how they think and act. Yet, within the corporate
world-as in corporate law theory-we see a secularization and de-
moralizing of discourse itself, largely due to the hegemony of finance• 2 3 1
language. The result is a predominant, through not universal, norm
that only secular speech, not sacred, is permitted at the highest echelons
of corporate life. That norm will change only by altering practice, just as
corporate charity, now the norm but controversial several decades ago,
resulted from a gradual change in practice over many years.23 Practice
itself will change only if, spurred by the legal obligation to be "faithful"
fiduciaries, corporate leaders feel free to revive the use of helpful reli-
gious concepts and discourse in corporate decision-making. This ap-
proach, voluntary but prompted by a legal duty, is at once more modest
than the legislative approach offered by Stabile,233 and, in a pluralist soci-
ety adhering to a norm of self-restraint on religious talk, potentially more
disquieting. Doing so, however, provides several significant benefits, not
only for corporations and corporate participants, but also for the state of
religious discussion in society at large.
224. Matthew 18:21-35 (New International).
225. See Genesis 2:5, 15 (New International).
226. Colossians 3:23 (New International).
227. Colossians 4:1 (New International).
228. See supra text accompanying note 135.
229. See supra text accompanying note 136.
230. 1 Corinthians 12:12-27 (New International). Stabile makes this point very compel-
lingly. Stabile, Using Religion, supra note 17, at 849-51.
231. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
232. Elhauge, supra note 24, at 763; Winkler, supra note 26, at 117-18 & nn.51-61.
233. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
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A. Beyond Self-Interest
A core, almost talismanic tenet of neo-classical economics holds that
humans predominantly are motivated by maximizing their own self-
interest,234 and that such individual conduct, in aggregate, produces so-
cially optimal results.235 As a social theory, this model for reconciling
individual and group welfare has wide and growing academic currency.23'
When corporate law imported economic theory,237 so too it adopted this
"canonical assumption."238 This conception of human behavior now pow-
erfully, almost invisibly, influences the language, social norms, and design
of institutional and management practices within business corporations.23'
In this way, when ideas, such as that self-interest predominantly moti-
vates human conduct, are routinely assumed in a particular discipline-
economics and, later, corporate legal theory-they can become self-
fulfilling "because, through their effect on actions and decisions, they
produce a world that corresponds to the assumptions and ideas them-
selves. ' ,240 Consequently, the terms of discourse within corporate law
theory, and within the corporate institution itself, powerfully shape what
is and is not considered right conduct. As stated by Robert Bellah: "In-
stitutions are very much dependent on language: what we cannot imagine
and express in language has little chance of becoming a sociological real-
ity." 24' Moreover, language, like power, abhors a vacuum. Bellah attrib-
utes the rise of the "market maximizer" paradigm of human motivation
to the dramatic weakening of the languages of biblical religion and civic
234. Dale T. Miller, The Norm of Self-Interest, 54 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1053, 1053
(1999) (noting that self-interest has been "enthroned as the cardinal human motive");
Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic
Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 317 & n.1 (1977) ("'[Tjhe first principle of Economics is
that every agent is actuated only by self-interest."' (quoting F.Y. EDGEWORTH,
MATHEMATICAL PSYCHICS: AN ESSAY ON THE APPLICATION OF MATHEMATICS TO THE
MORAL SCIENCES 16 (1881))). For strong critiques of the self-interest principle, see Su-
mantra Ghoshal, Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices,
4 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING & EDuC. 75, 79 (2005); Henry Mintzberg et al., Beyond Self-
ishness, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 67, 67 (2002).
235. Fabrizio Ferraro et al., Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories Can
Become Self-Fulfilling, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 8, 12 (2005) ("The presumption in much
economic theory is that, under certain conditions such as competitive markets, the pursuit
of self-interest produces socially optimal results.").
236. See id. at 10-11; Ghoshal, supra note 234, at 84.
237. See generally EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4; Johnson, supra note 8, at
2235-48 (criticizing this development).
238. Joseph Henrich et al., In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in
15 Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 73, 73 (2001).
239. Ferraro et al., supra note 235, at 10-11.
240. Id. at 12; see also supra note 3.
241. BELLAH ET AL., supra note 8, at 15.
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republicanism. Bellah's observation draws on Alan Wolfe's suggestion
that the teachings of economics (and corporate theory) aspire to the
status of moral philosophy or a new religion, precisely by virtue of de-
cline in other sources of authority: "When neither religion, tradition, nor
literature is capable of serving as a common moral language, it may be
that the one moral code all modern people can understand is self-
interest."'2 43 Such a belief system provides, to use Isaiah Berlin's phrase,
44
"a single intelligible structure" for comprehensively ordering social real-
ity, seeking to displace accounts earlier provided by religion and moral
philosophy.
Religious language, emphasizing the command to serve others and the
duty to be faithful to the interests of others, can counter the lingua
franca of rampant self-interest. Sacrificial service long has been hallowed
in civil society, thanks to religious and moral traditions acclaiming such
behavior. And as observed by Laura Nash and Marc Gunther, genuine
service to others (not as disguised egoism) can influence business behav-
ior.246 A key ingredient for those seeking more other-regarding conduct
is to facilitate it via accessible language. The notion of faithfulness,
247drawn from fiduciary duty discourse as seen in the Disney case, permits
a person of faith to "map" from the conceptual domain of religion-
where faithfulness is lauded-to the domain of business, where it can
subdue the natural impulse and prevailing norm of self-interest. Recall-
ing the "Parable of the Good Samaritan" or the "Parable of the Faithful
Steward," among others stories or teachings, can powerfully counter an
inclination toward self-centeredness.
Corporate law does not prohibit faith-based rationales or justification.
Many shareholders expressly act from religious convictions.248  Many
managers do as well, though fewer probably say they do.4 Section 2.01
of the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance broadly states that,
"[e]ven if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby en-
242. Robert N. Bellah, The Church in Tension with a Lockean Culture, NEW OXFORD
REV., Dec. 1990, at 10, 14.
243. ALAN WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? SOCIAL SCIENCE AND MORAL OBLIGATION
36 (1989).
244. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
ESSAYS 312-13 (Henry Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 1998).
245. See supra Part V.
246. See generally NASH, supra note 16; GUNTHER, supra note 16.
247. See supra notes 177-78, 190-96 and accompanying text.
248. For example, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility "is an association
of 275 faith-based institutional investors ... [that] press[es] companies to be socially and
environmentally responsible." Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, Homepage,
http://www.iccr.org (last visited Sept. 28, 2006).
249. NASH, supra note 16, at 246 (finding that executives reported "suppressing reli-
gious language while keeping the essential moral stance of their faith").
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hanced," corporate decision-makers "[m]ay take into account ethical
considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the respon-
sible conduct of business." ' 0  The Reporter's comment notes that
"[c]orporate officials are not less morally obliged than any other citizens
to take ethical considerations into account,"' so long as such "considera-
tions are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible conduct
of business. ' '252 Such ethical considerations, moreover, are appropriate if
they "have significant support although less-than-universal accep-
tance." 3  In America, where stewardship and altruistic values "are
deeply rooted in religion," 4 faith can provide a grounding and grammar
for such ethical considerations.
A faith-based conception of faithfulness can provide a moral footing
for managers seeking to fulfill their legal obligation of faithfulness, as
expressed in Disney.f5 Many calls for socially responsible conduct,
whether merely anti-contractarianism or more fully rendered communi-
tarian visions, lack a compelling moral framework. For religious believ-
ers, the notion of faithfulness provides a foundation for constructing, or
at least a lens for envisioning, a more ethical corporation. Moreover, to
alter the prevailing discourse and norm of self-interest requires a viable
alternative vocabulary, and it requires managers brave enough-and
faithful enough-to invoke it. Doing so can, over time, alter beliefs and
norms about the appropriateness and usefulness of such language. This,
in turn, can alter institutional practice and make such language and
modes of thought more pervasive. This will not eradicate the deep, self-
interested impulses of fallen humanity, but it will allow managers to
frame, and argue for, a redemptive counterpoise to those impulses.
Managers might then more fully appreciate that, like other humans, they
have at least some freedom to choose, and therefore some freedom (and
duty) to make moral choices for the common (corporate) good. Corpo-
rate scholars, for their part, must go on, in theoretical work, to make
room for the presence of the religious voice within the corporation.
Without that voice, corporate law theory will too narrowly conceive the
business organization as presenting "a negative problem of preventing
'bad' people from doing harm," 256 rather than also "enabling 'good' peo-
ple to do good."5
7
250. 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (1994).
251. Id. § 2.01 cmt. h.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See NEUHAUS, supra note 13, at 21.
255. See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
256. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 12 (1982).
257. Id.
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B. Avoiding the Divided Self
Professors Alford and Naughton note the assertion of Tom Peters, co-
author of the best-selling book In Search of Excellence,28 that religious
talk "has no place in the 'secular corporation."' 9 They believe this re-
flects a widely held view that "'religion by its nature is a private affair, to
be left at home."' 260 This too was the earlier assessment of sociologist
Peter Berger who declared in 1969, that, in America, "religion has be-
come privately meaningful and publicly irrelevant." 26' That dramatically
changed in the larger political and cultural arena in the late 1970s a
change we still live with in the early twenty-first century. Within the
evangelical Christian community, renewed social awareness may reflect
the influence of theologian Carl Henry, whose stinging critique of fun-
damentalism assailed its failure to engage society,263 instead focusing
solely on personal conversion.264 As Nash notes, however, many devout
Christians, although becoming more politically and socially engaged in
the latter part of the twentieth century, have ignored one key institution
in what they decry as an overly secular culture-the business corpora-
tion.265 The failure of Christian thought to attend specifically to the link-
ing of faith and work leads managers, Alford and Naughton observe, to
live "a divided life," where matters of spirit and business occupy wholly
separate spheres.2 6
In recent years, greater attention has been given to the connection be-
tween faith and vocation. To use a term coined by Professor Noah
Feldman in another context, at least some "'values evangelicals"' have
discovered the cultural significance of the corporation. 67 This, of course,
can be beneficial for the corporation itself, leading to healthy, ongoing
debate over the purpose of business in a democratic society. The blend-
ing of faith and work also, however, has great significance to the individ-
ual by helping him or her to regain a sense of meaning and spiritual
258. THOMAS J. PETERS & ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF
EXCELLENCE: LESSONS FROM AMERICA'S BEST-RUN COMPANIES (1982).
259. ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 90, at 11 (quoting Tom Peters, Spiritual Talk
Has No Place in Secular Corporation, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 6, 1993, at D2).
260. Id. (emphasis omitted).
261. NASH, supra note 16, at 19 (citation omitted).
262. For a full account, see generally NEUHAUS, supra note 13.
263. CARL F. H. HENRY, THE UNEASY CONSCIENCE OF MODERN FUNDAMENTALISM
15-34 (1947).
264. See Alister McGrath, Calvin and the Christian Calling, in THE SECOND ONE
THOUSAND YEARS: TEN PEOPLE WHO DEFINED A MILLENNIUM 66, 74 (Richard John
Neuhaus ed., 2001).
265. NASH, supra note 16, at 29.
266. ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 90, at 12.
267. FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 7 (defining values evangelicals as "those who insist on
the direct relevance of religious values to political life.").
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wholeness through work. As noted by Thierry Pauchant, who teaches
ethical management at the HEC Montreal Business School: "'It was ta-
boo for so many years to talk about workers' spirituality'..... 'But people
are suffering by not being able to address that part of themselves and
lead a more integrated life."' 2  Other graduate business schools, includ-
ing Columbia, Stanford, and Notre Dame, are adding courses that use
literature and religious readings to acquaint students with the spiritual
and religious aspects of work in their lives. 269 For many people of faith,
the whole point of work means to be called into the everyday world to
serve God in his creation,270 thereby dissolving the supposed distinction
between sacred and secular work. As expressed by Oxford theologian
Alistair McGrath: "Work is, quite simply, an act of praise-a potentially
productive act of praise. Work glorifies God, it serves the common good,
and it is something through which human creativity can express itself."' 7'
Senior corporate decision-makers need a vocabulary appropriate for
bridging legal and religious modes of discourse, for linking fiduciary du-
ties and faith. The notion of faithfulness nicely conveys both a legal obli-
gation to advance the interests of others and a moral command grounded
in religious belief and tradition. The enormous deference accorded direc-
tors and officers means they have great latitude in choosing whether and
how, in particular settings addressing specific issues, they give content to
the notion of faithfulness. This allows, by habitual exercise, the devel-
opment of moral conscience and ethical practice in business context. The
emphasis here, however, is not on how doing so will alter the language,
norms, and practices of the corporation itself, but how doing so will trans-
form the outlook of the individual decision-maker. Directors and senior
officers will be freed from the psychological and spiritual burden of keep-
ing two distinct moral frames of reference, one for work and the other for
the rest of life. Instead, they will face the formidable challenge of deter-
mining how to advance the common corporate good by drawing on un-
derstandings of faithfulness derived from deeper sources of authority,
including religious conviction. This deliberative, integrative mode of
thinking can be demanding, and one may be tempted to find refuge in the
"divided life" and in the simplifying pursuit of self-interest. The quest for
268. Ronald Alsop, M.B.A. Track/Focus on Academics, Careers and Other B-School
Trends, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2005, at B6.
269. Id. Patricia Aburdene, the author of a new book on spiritual trends in corporate
culture, Megatrends 2010: The Rise of Conscious Capitalism, believes that "[pleople no
longer want that spiritual part of themselves to be abandoned when they work and are
searching for meaning and morals in the workplace." Lampman, supra note 45.
270. See McGrath, supra note 264, at 71-73.
271. Id. at 72. This idea is captured as well in the Benedictine motto "to pray is to
work, to work is to pray." See Josd H. Gomez, All You Who Labor: Towards a Spirituality
of Work for the 21st Century, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 791,804 (2006).
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wholeness in outlook, honestly expressed, however, will bring both per-
sonal and corporate gain. Only with practice will such reflection become
a moral habit as well as an institutional norm.
C. Diversity of Viewpoint
A sound decision-making process, the essence of the fiduciary duty of
272due care, would seem to dictate consideration of an array of viewpoints.
Opinions may differ not only as to what, ultimately, is the best course of
action, but also as to supporting rationales and justificatory approach.
Drawing on Cass Sunstein's argument on the value of dissent in social
groups,273 including corporate boards,274 Kent Greenfield recently argued
for stakeholder representation on boards of directors. 27' Although mak-
ing more of an argument for positional diversity than for a diversity of
underlying beliefs, Greenfield rightly notes that better group decision-
making results from weighing a wider range of views: "We recognize in
legislative bodies, administrative agencies, school faculties, and non-
profit boards that diversity of viewpoints and people increases the likeli-
hood that dissent will be welcomed, important perspectives will be heard,
and decisions will be more fully vetted.
276
Although recent discussions about diversity within the legal academy
have centered on gender, race, and ethnicity,277 there is no reason to think
a religious perspective thoughtfully and civilly brought to bear on corpo-
rate issues would not usefully supplement and enrich a wholly secular
discourse, and lead to the usual benefits associated with pluralism. Al-
ford and Naughton make this point as well, arguing that "[i]n an age of
diversity and multiculturalism, Christians can make the business world
more diverse precisely by infusing their explicit, Christian beliefs into the
272. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
273. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
274. Id. at 27-28 ("The highest-performing companies tend to have extremely conten-
tious boards that regard dissent as a duty and that 'have a good fight now and then."'
(quoting Jeffrey A. Sonnenfield, What Makes Great Boards Great, 80 HARV. Bus. REV.
106, 111 (2002))).
275. Greenfield, supra note 27, at 115-18.
276. Id. at 117-18; see also Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on
Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363 (2002) (arguing for diverse perspec-
tives on corporate boards of directors). For a critical assessment of business rationales, as
opposed to moral and social rationales, for board diversity, see Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bot-
tom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business Rationales for Diver-
sity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WiS. L. REV. 795,797 (2005).
277. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) ("'[C]lassroom discussion is
livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting' when the students
have 'the greatest possible variety of backgrounds."' (citations omitted)); Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244, 249-51 (2003); see also Timothy L. Hall, Educational Diversity: View-
points and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 573-74 (1998) (describing the argument that the
diversity rationale for affirmative action uses race as a proxy for distinctive viewpoint).
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work they do.",178 To hold otherwise is to think that discourse in corpo-
rate practice and corporate theory must, for some unexplained reason, be
wholly secular, or to believe that the value of including varied viewpoints
uniquely breaks down, thereby requiring exclusion, when religious per-
spective occasions the diversity.
If anything, a faith-based perspective, by invoking a strikingly different
frame of reference, affords an even more diverse lens on business issues
than do a variety of purely secular outlooks. As philosopher George San-
tayana observed about a religion's particularity:
Thus every living and healthy religion has a marked idiosyncrasy.
... The vistas it opens and the mysteries it propounds are another
world to live in; and another world to live in -whether we expect
ever to pass wholly into it or no-is what we mean by having a re-
ligion.279
This difference is well evidenced in the "creative tension" found by
Nash to characterize the fertile interplay between faith and business for
serious believers.m She concludes her case study by noting that one of
her most important discoveries was the importance "of an example or a
metaphor to" succinctly capture that interplay.281 Religious writings, no-
tably the Bible in the Western world, 2 have long enriched literature and
everyday discourse as a lavish storehouse of such stories, metaphors, and
illustrations for conveying moral wisdom and common knowledge. 283 As
noted earlier, the concept of faithfulness in religious faith abounds with
rich, instructive illustrations, including many stories and parables.2
These scriptural allusions, when called to mind, shed light on, and so en-
hance, a decision-maker's understanding of what it means to act faith-
fully. Urging individual corporate leaders to draw on, and describe, reli-
gious reckonings of faithfulness can usefully expand both their own and
their colleagues' understanding of that ideal.
278. ALFORD & NAUGHTON, supra note 90, at 29.
279. SANTAYANA, supra note 129, at 180.
280. See NASH, supra note 16, at xiii, 45.
281. Id. at 277. For an intriguing argument by Edward Rock that the Delaware courts
transmit fiduciary standards of conduct by means of "stories" and "parables," see Edward
B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1009, 1016 (1997). My argument is not inconsistent with Rock's, but it is the opposite
argument: recalling stories and parables from outside the law actually helps directors and
officers better understand their legal obligations.
282. See THE BIBLE AND ITS INFLUENCE (Cullen Schippe & Chuck Stetson eds.,
2006).
283. Id. at 10-11, 24-25 (noting the pervasive influence of the Bible on such public
figures as Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King, Jr. and on numerous writers and
artists); see also Samuel W. Calhoun, Grounding Normative Assertions: Arthur Leffs Still
Irrefutable, but Incomplete, "Sez Who?" Critique, 20 J.L. & RELIGION 31, 93 (2005)
("[T]he Bible does incontrovertibly state many of mankind's most basic moral precepts.").
284. See supra Part V.A.
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D. A Safe Place for Religious Discourse
This Article seeks neither the joinder nor the separation of law and re-
ligion. It argues, rather, for the good to be gained by adding the religious
voice to corporate discourse, both in legal theory and business practice.
There is good to be gained for corporations, for senior decision-makers,
for those who depend on the corporate institution, and for the state of
religious discourse itself in a free, pluralistic society. Currently, there is
sharp disagreement over the place of religion in public discourse.25 De-
bate largely centers on the propriety of various kinds of governmental
involvement in matters touching on religion, due to well-founded consti-
tutional concerns286 The fallout from that altogether fitting legal debate,
regrettably, has spilled over into other institutions forming part of our
civil society, where no constitutional issue arises. We now observe an
awkward uncertainty as to whether, how, and where religious beliefs may
inform, and be expressed on, matters of public (but non-governmental)
moment. Where, in other words, in the vast social sphere called civil so-
ciety lying between home and the statehouse, can religious and not just
secular discourse be drawn on? That discourse within corporate law the-
ory and corporations remains so highly secular may be just one instance
of this larger perplexity.
Within corporate law theory and practice, it is widely acknowledged
that directors and officers have broad latitude, by virtue of certain struc-
tural features of the public corporation, corporate statutes, and the busi-
ness judgment rule.7 In a governance arrangement ordained by law,
senior decision-makers wield, within the corporation, a discretion eerily
akin to that of lawmakers themselves. The law, through fiduciary duties,
seeks to curb somewhat the full play of that liberty and draws, especially
in the notions of loyalty and faithfulness, on concepts also (but not only)
carrying religious significance. This is not to say that the concept of
"faithfulness" articulated in Disney is bottomed on a religious founda-
tion, though "originalist" notions of loyalty within corporate law very
likely were shaped by scripture.8 8 Instead, in an ironic twist to the long-
standing "religious foundations of law" debate,289 fiduciary duty law,
rather than grounding law on religion, invites decision-makers to under-
stand their legal obligation by drawing on religion. In short, rather than
moving from religion to law, corporate law permits (but does not obli-
gate) decision-makers to move from law to religion as a way to better
285. FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 6-8 (describing a "divided" America).
286. Id.
287. See supra Part II.B.
288. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Martin E. Marty, The Religious Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J.
(SPECIAL EDITION) 291 (2005).
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understand their legal duty. The values of liberty and pluralism prevail in
this arrangement-religion of one's own choosing may or may not be
availed of in guiding the exercise of broad discretion only loosely con-
strained by law. In a society where many are religious, one would expect
such a turning, provided the decision-makers themselves believe it is
helpful and proper to do So.
Limited empirical work suggests a reticence on the part of business el-
ites to use religious terms in describing the rationales for business deci-
sions.29' Much of the scholarship on religious discourse in American soci-
ety addresses non-business discourse, though Timothy Fort, assessing the
work of Thomas Nagel, Michael Perry, and Kent Greenawalt on the role
of religion in public policy debates,292 argues strongly that business people
should be able to rely on religious justification for moral positions. 3
Addressing what this Article earlier called the "divided self" problem,
4
Fort believes "there is no inherent reason to force a business person...
to compartmentalize the motivations that dictate her or his [ethical]
treatment of others." 295 He adds to this, moreover, a concern that prohib-
iting religious discourse leads to dishonesty because managers who in fact
may have looked to faith for guidance state otherwise when describing
the basis for their views. 9 Honesty is an odd casualty when more ethical
conduct is being sought in the corporate world. Moreover, self-imposed
silence denies other participants in the decision-making process full
knowledge about the motivations and rationales of their colleagues. 29,
Methodologically, this does not make for informed decisions.
Even stronger warrant for seeking guidance in faith can be found in the
legal obligation to act faithfully. Senior business leaders, being fully ad-
vised by counsel of that post-Disney legal responsibility, will seek, one
hopes, to make sense of that term. Some will turn, no doubt, to literary
or historical sources, peer guidance, or personal experiences, while others
will turn to faith and tradition, for direction in formulating strategic pol-
icy and in making operating decisions. The result is likely to be more
vital, vigorous, and "zesty" discussion, as a broader range of stories and
viewpoints are presented. Those engaging in such dialogue, however,
290. This raises the critical question of whether and how lawyers advise directors and
officers as to the duty of faithfulness.
291. NASH, supra note 16, at 246-47.
292. Fort, supra note 99 at 456-69; see also John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping
Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 1, 1 (1987) (arguing for secular conversation).
293. Fort, supra note 99, at 469-71.
294. See supra Part VI.B.
295. Fort, supra note 99, at 470.
296. Id. Professor Feldman calls such secular arguments "stand-ins." FELDMAN, supra
note 23, at 224.
297. See Fort, supra note 99, at 470.
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must appreciate that others in the room may not share their frame of ref-
erence or even understand the meaning or significance of certain terms.
That will require patience, respect, and clarity of expression. Even when
clearly and fully explained, a position grounded in faith may encounter
bewilderment or outright rejection, both by those of a similar faith tradi-
tion who, nonetheless, reason differently and by those who simply do not
share core beliefs.298
This possibility should not be regretted. It should, instead, be wel-
comed. Social harmony does not depend on ignorance enforced by a
norm of self-restraint on religious speech. In a pluralist society with rep-
resentative corporate leadership, persons holding fully revealed, diverse
viewpoints must reason together to reach a group decision. Bound by the
pragmatic need to reach a collective position, a corporate board must
patiently work through individual differences to reach consensus. It is a
formidable struggle to endeavor to resolve, rather than evade, honest
differences.
Being free to promote business positions on religious grounds, of
course, does not mean there is not risk in doing so. Beyond substantive
disagreement, some colleagues may believe it is simply improper to in-
voke faith-based language in business. That point of view is permitted as
well, and it must be thoughtfully engaged. If properly engaged, a real
possibility for honest dialogue opens up. Noah Feldman illustrates how
this willingness to encounter a faith-based moral position might proceed.
Feldman suggests that one could ask a believer
how his faith directs him to make moral judgments about the
world and how we ought to act in it? Almost no believer will
simply repeat that he just knows morality as an automatic matter,
or that God has directly told him the right way to live. Prophets
hear directly from God; most religious believers will point to reli-
gious texts and traditions that they consider authoritative guides
for living. They will mention the Bible or the Qur'an, the teach-
ings of a church or of rabbis or other sages. Even denominations
that believe in direct inspiration, such as Quakers or some evan-
gelicals, rarely think there is no room for interpretation. If one
asks the believer how he knows what his Scripture or his tradition
teaches about the good life, he will likely answer that he, alone or
with others, must interpret the teachings of his faith to make
sense of how they apply to the real world.
Once the believer acknowledges, as he almost surely will, that
religion calls for human interpretation, the possibilities for hold-
ing a conversation about important moral topics open up dra-
298. See Calhoun, supra note 283, at 89-94 (discussing challenge of applying religious
belief in particular settings).
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matically. For one thing, anybody can engage a believer on the
question of how his or her religious tradition should be translated
into the political sphere ....
So religious belief can jump-start conversations as well as stop
them. No religious tradition is without internal discussion, de-
bate, and disagreement about hard questions, and even an out-
sider can take on these subjects if he bothers to learn the basic
beliefs from which the believers are arguing. If believers do not
want to engage outsiders' interpretations of their tradition, the
outsiders can still argue about how the religious beliefs should be
applied in the [particular] context .... If the religious believer as-
serts that the answers to these second-order questions, too, are
dictated by religious belief, the outsider can still ask why it should
be so and find a subject for discussion in the answer to that ques-
tion.299
A June 2005 meeting of the Nortel board of directors provides a corpo-
rate illustration. The chief operating officer, Gary Daichendt, a deeply
religious Christian, told Nortel directors at the board meeting to which he
was invited that he and his wife had prayed that morning for guidance.30
Mr. Daichendt reported that he understood God's response to be that he,
Daichendt, should be named chief executive officer of Nortel, and that
the current CEO and the chief financial officer should be replaced.0' The
directors' response, reportedly, was "astonishment. '' 30, One director di-
rectly asked what Daichendt's difficulty was with the current CEO and
CFO, thereby doing what Feldman urges; he posed a question that sought
a fruitful basis for further discussion. Reportedly, Daichendt's response
was not impressive. Also, apparently, directors decided Daichendt was
not ready for the top post, possibly because of the ambition he revealed,
rather than because of the terms in which he expressed what came
through as a power play. 03 The point here is that Daichendt's simplistic
religious speech neither stopped the conversation nor carried the day.
Any business leader who chooses to draw on religious faith in this way
must recall, as Martin Marty puts it, that each speaker "simply does not
have the field to itself.''314 Marty, like Michael Perry in the political
305
realm, cautions that those who resort to particular religious claims "too
299. FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 226-27.
300. James Bagnall, The Day God Walked into Nortel's Boardroom, CALGARY
HERALD, July 10, 2005, at D3.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Marty, supra note 289, at 321.
305. MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD?: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 116-17, 122-23 (2003).
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blithely or too frontally" may not fully appreciate the risks, including
what Marty sees as the risk that the speaker's own absolutes will be rela-
tivized when encountered by persons who see things differently.3°6 The
point here is simply that much good can be gained from honest religious
speech, but at the probable price of some discomfort and risk. The deci-
sion as to whether, where, and how to draw on faith in the business set-
ting must itself be carefully made.
Success in using and encountering religious discourse in the corpora-
tion may raise our social comfort level with religious speech in other set-
tings, most likely in other social but nongovernmental contexts, but per-
haps eventually including the public square itself. Increasingly, people
may more widely appreciate that, as Stephen Prothero put it, "it is not
un-American to bring religious reasoning into our public debates.' 307 A
freer flow of religious speech will not put an end to nonreligious reason-
ing by any means. Nonreligious reasoning will remain predominant in
many settings, but it may be more freely and comfortably supplemented
with non-secular discourse, so that "bi-lingual" conversation is more fre-
quent. As Bellah reminds us about social institutions, not only do we
form them, but they form us as well;30 and they "are not only constrain-
ing but also enabling., 3°' Business leaders-and the leaders of other civil
institutions -who become more at ease with, and learn the benefits of
(and how best to avoid the drawbacks of) religious discourse, may inspire
others to do so in other settings, possibly thereby allaying some of the
skittishness over the place of religious talk in a free society. In this way,
corporations can be "social laboratories" for experimentation,310 with
corporations possibly varying greatly in how they handle this issue.
Those emerging as attractive (or unattractive) can serve as models for
others to emulate (or eschew). The spillover benefits thus may flow not
only to other business organizations, but eventually, perhaps, to other
voluntary associations and to some venues of public discourse more gen-
erally. A voluntary, eclectic, "federalism-like" approach is most condu-
cive to such healthy, adaptive experimentation.
The argument advanced here as to corporate law and practice is conso-
nant with that broadly made by Noah Feldman in the constitutional
arena, to the effect that we should "loosen up on religious talk., 31' Pro-
ponents of an exclusively secular discourse, while seeking to embrace
inclusiveness, may ironically exclude believers from a sense of full par-
306. Marty, supra note 289, at 321.
307. Prothero, supra note 207.
308. Bellah, supra note 242, at 12.
309. Id.
310. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
311. FELDMAN, supra note 23, at 238.
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ticipation in conversations where religious talk is derided.312 Rather than
abruptly stopping moral conversation,313 if the unwritten ground rule of
civil discourse is that only secular terms are permitted, conversation may
never even get going in a way that acknowledges the existence of a true
moral debate. 14 More robust religious discourse throughout civil soci-
ety-where a norm of restraint of uncertain strength now exists-might
actually lead to a reduction in insistence on religious displays in public
settings. Such insistence may reflect regret over the quieting of religious
voice in social settings generally, rather than a strong belief that govern-
ment should provide a forum for such displays.
For many believers, it remains the case that religious values underlie
moral positions and it is best to allow people to draw on primary beliefs
when making moral argument. Attempting this strategy, modestly,
within the corporation and other civil institutions can help us gauge its
effectiveness in moving us beyond endless debate over the terms of de-
bate and into discussion of genuine substantive concern. Reflecting on
the meaning of faithfulness in the corporate setting, by drawing on its
significance in faith, can be a step in that direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Corporate law theory has been vastly enriched over the last thirty years
by the insights of numerous disciplinary perspectives. One vantage point
conspicuously missing, however, is that of religious faith. This reflects a
social norm of uncertain strength, not a legal requirement. Moreover, the
absence of religious voice in corporate law is somewhat odd because
many business people-like many others in the United States-are peo-
ple of faith, and faith can, at least in the fiduciary duty area, serve as a
rich resource for better understanding the post-Disney legal obligation to
be faithful. There are many benefits for permitting and encouraging
business people (and their lawyers and corporate theorists) to be more
open about the connection between religious faith and business. Busi-
ness people themselves benefit from gaining another source for under-
standing their legal duties and from the ability to engage in honest con-
versation. Corporate conduct itself may also benefit by altering the social
norm of suppressing religious speech. Finally, greater comfort in the cor-
porate milieu may serve to usefully reduce current skittishness about reli-
312. Id. at 243-44.
313. Feldman challenges Richard Rorty's position that religion is a ".conversation
stopper."' Id. at 225 (citation omitted).
314. Id. at 227. Feldman also challenges Stanley Fish's assertion that, with religious
speech, "the conversation 'will never get started."' Id. at 225 & n.6 (quoting STANLEY
FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 256 (1999)). Feldman believes such speech can, in
fact, "jump-start conversations as well as stop them." Id. at 227.
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gious thinking and speech in the larger social arena, a plus in a pluralist
society.
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